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 The role of skilled labor in the modern economy and its importance in 
explaining trends in wage inequality and productivity has been a focus of a broad 
strand of research in economics.  Labor is an input into production that is very 
different from capital or materials.  One key difference is that workers must decide 
where they are going to live, and in making that decision, they thereby limit the 
opportunity set of jobs available to them.  In turn, firms must also make a location 
decision that affects their access to labor and potentially affects their decisions on the 
technology they will adopt.  While many economists have studied issues related to 
technology adoption and worker skill broadly, the geographic element is rarely 
developed.  This dissertation exploits the variation in the concentration in skilled 
labor across local labor markets in a sample of U.S. States to study how movements 
of workers affect the distribution of skill across geography, the investment decisions 
by firms in reaction to the variation in skill and finally the effect of this variation on 
worker’s wages across local labor markets.  Given that skilled labor is an important 
  
force in the economy, variation in the concentration of skilled workers across local 
labor markets may also play an important role. 
 The research set out here confirms this hypothesis.  Workers locate non-
randomly across geography and their movements reinforce the existing distribution of 
skill across local labor markets.  As predicted by a model of endogenous technology, 
firms react to the skill level of their local labor market.  Variation in firm level 
investment can be partially explained by variation in the availability of skilled labor.  
The empirical work shows that among a sample of manufacturing firms in 1992, a 
one standard deviation increase in county skill leads to a 10% increase in firm level 
investment in computers.  Finally, highly skilled workers receive higher wages in 
metro areas with strong concentrations of skill.  Deeper examination of the data 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The role of skilled labor in the modern economy and its importance in 
explaining trends in wage inequality and productivity has been a focus of a broad 
strand of research in economics.  Labor is an input into production that is very 
different from capital or materials.  One key difference is that workers must decide 
where they are going to live, and in making that decision, they thereby limit the 
opportunity set of jobs available to them.  In turn, firms must also make a location 
decision that affects their access to labor and potentially affects their decisions on the 
technology they will adopt.  While many economists have studied issues related to 
technology adoption and worker skill broadly, the geographic element is rarely 
developed.  This dissertation exploits the variation in the concentration in skilled 
labor across local labor markets in a sample of U.S. States to further study how 
mobility decisions of workers affect the distribution of skill across geography, the 
investment decisions by firms in reaction to the variation in skill and finally the effect 
of this variation on worker’s wages across local labor markets.  Given that skilled 
labor is an important force in the economy, variation in the concentration of skilled 
workers across local labor markets may also play an important role. 
 Before studying the effect of variation in the concentration of skilled labor on 
firms and workers, the next chapter lays out the extent of the variation and how these 
patterns change over time through movements of workers.  Previous research in this 
area has focused on the characteristics of workers that affect their decision to move 




the resulting patterns of worker mobility, and the final effect on worker’s wages by 
skill.  This chapter takes a different perspective and focuses on the local labor market 
skill level.  Using an extensive database of workers, this chapter focuses on both 
cross-sectional variation in skilled labor across local labor markets and also on time-
series trends in skill level.  In addition to testing for statistically significant variation 
in skill level across counties and metro areas, this essay asks if the extent of this 
variation is economically important through studying patterns in county level skill 
both across counties and across time.  The research shows that the distribution of 
county skill appears to be bimodal, suggesting that they are two types of counties as 
defined by skill.  These patterns largely persist over time.  The small changes in the 
distribution of county skill over time are decomposed into the components due to 
workers who continue to work in the same county over the time period, workers who 
enter and leave the labor force, and workers who work in different counties in the 
beginning and end of the time period.  This chapter shows that while workers are very 
mobile, their mobility patterns reinforce the existing patterns in the distribution of 
county skill. 
 The next chapter utilizes this variation in the skill level of local labor markets 
to study endogenous technology.  Labor is an input to production different from 
capital or materials in that workers must decide to locate near their place of 
employment, resulting in significant variation in the skill level of available workers 
across areas.  Does this variation affect the technology decisions of firms?  New 
technologies boost the productivity of firms, but research has shown that the biggest 




skilled workers.  The previous chapter outlines the patterns of skilled labor across 
geography noting that these skilled workers are not equally available across local 
labor markets. This chapter continues on this theme, focusing on whether or not firms 
take variation in the availability of skilled labor into consideration when making 
investment decisions.  A model is developed in which two assumptions about the 
economy lead to endogenous technology.  The first is that skilled labor and 
technology are complementary inputs.  The second assumption is that firms make 
their investment decision before hiring workers.  Under this set of assumptions, the 
model shows that firms will invest more in highly skilled areas because their 
probability of finding a skilled worker is higher in a more skilled labor market.  The 
empirical work then tests the model using data on the computer investment decisions 
of manufacturing firms in 1992 in combination with the data utilized in the previous 
chapter on local labor market skill.  Estimates of the effect of endogenous technology 
predict that a one standard deviation increase in local labor market skill will lead to 
roughly a 10% increase in technology investment.  The results are shown to be robust 
to a series of different specifications of the investment equation. 
 In the final essay, the focus is on the effect of variation in concentrations of 
skilled labor on worker’s wages.  Public funding of education has largely been 
motivated by the belief that the returns to an individual’s education reward the greater 
economy.  Potential mechanisms by which these social returns accrue include 
spillovers to other workers through informal communications and greater investment 
by firms to take advantage of high worker skill, as outlined above.  Both sets of 




productive.  Economists have tested for higher worker productivity in highly skilled 
labor markets by studying worker’s wages.  This simple test leads to a variety of 
measurement issues mostly focused on the unobservable differences of workers in 
highly skilled labor markets.  Workers in these labor markets are, by definition, more 
highly educated.  Given that they are a selected group, it is likely that they also vary 
on unobservable dimensions that might additionally lead to differences in their wages.  
Earlier papers have addressed this issue by trying to control for unobservable worker 
characteristics via a person fixed effect.  While this methodology will control for 
characteristics such as ability, the estimation implicitly restricts the return to these 
unobservable characteristics to be the same in high and low skill labor markets.  This 
essay addresses this measurement question by directly estimating the return to 
unobservable worker characteristics separately in high and low skill areas by using 
variation in the labor market skill of workers who switch jobs.  After controlling for 
education, experience, and unobservable worker characteristics, and allowing for the 
returns to these characteristics to vary in low and high skill areas, the remaining wage 
gap between workers in high and low skill areas becomes insignificant.  These results 
do not necessarily suggest that workers in high skill areas are not more productive 
than those in low skill areas, but rather it is the most skilled workers who receive a 




Chapter 2: Geographic Dispersion of Human Capital 
 
Analysis of worker migration within the United States has found that high 
skill workers are highly mobile in absolute terms and relative to low skill workers.  
Related research into wage and employment dynamics in local labor markets has 
looked into the response of workers to local demand shocks.  Complementing the 
earlier research on worker migration, studies of local labor market dynamics have 
found that the high mobility of skilled workers equalizes their wages across local 
labor markets.  While the same cannot be said for low skilled workers, the previous 
evidence suggests that the labor market for highly skilled workers is potentially 
national, and at a minimum larger than their local area.  This set of facts would lead 
one to believe that geography is irrelevant in the study of skilled workers.  However, 
the previous research has not shed light on the extent to which highly skilled workers 
are distributed across geography.  Given a national market for highly skilled workers, 
a firm requiring highly skilled workers would not be limited to any particular labor 
market, and geography would be irrelevant.  However, if skilled labor clusters in 
particular areas and the mobility patterns of skilled workers reinforces these existing 
distributions of labor across geography, then the availability of skilled labor and 
geography more generally remains an important factor for a variety of issues in labor 
economics.  There is little existing research that analyzes the distribution of highly 
skilled workers across geography.  This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the 




Despite the fact that little is known about the variation in human capital across 
local labor markets, many economic models depend on this variation or on 
concentrations of highly skilled workers to explain variation in other worker 
characteristics or firm behavior.  These models include those with increasing returns 
to human capital accumulation, firm externalities in human capital, and higher growth 
in skilled areas1.  In the next two chapters, a model of endogenous technology is 
developed in which firms in high human capital areas are more likely to invest in 
technology complementary to high skill workers, and a model with social returns to 
education motivates a study of variation in worker’s wages across areas of different 
skill types.  While the later chapters use micro-data to analyze endogenous 
technology and geographic variation in wages, this chapter asks a more basic 
question: is there an economically significant amount of variation in human capital 
across local labor markets?  If all firms face roughly the same skill distribution of 
workers in their local labor market, then one would not expect to find endogenous 
technology or any other variation in worker or firm characteristics across local labor 
markets that is attributable to variation in available local skill.  However, evidence 
which suggests that local labor markets can be distinguished by their worker skill 
distribution and by different patterns of firm and worker mobility by skill lend 
support to the class of models which rely on this type of variation. 
The first part of this chapter defines a measure of worker human capital that 
includes all fixed characteristics of the worker that are compensated by wages.  Given 
a definition of the local labor market and of worker skill, how does one determine 
whether or not there is economically significant variation in worker skill?  A first pass 
                                                 




at the data requires testing if there is a statistically significant amount of variation in 
worker skill across local labor markets.  However, this approach does not fully 
answer whether there is an economically significant level of variation in skill.  A 
local labor market level measure of worker skill is then constructed to compare the 
skill of local labor markets directly.  Using the labor market measure of skill it is 
possible to look at the distribution of counties by skill and to see how these 
distributions evolve over time.  Finally, beyond the aggregate patterns, it is also 
possible to decompose changes in the distribution of workers by county skill into 
components that are due to workers who continue working in the same county over 
the sample time period, workers who move between counties, entrants and exiters. 
The findings in this chapter do not support the hypothesis of a uniformly-
distributed, national labor market for high skill workers.  The data suggest that there 
is significant variation in skill across local labor markets and that this variation is 
persistent.  Further, the variation suggests that counties can also be classified as high 
and low skill.  Worker mobility patterns by skill provide further evidence that while 
workers are mobile, their mobility reinforces the existing distribution of skill across 
local labor markets.   
2.1 Background 
The high mobility of highly educated people has been well documented.  
Greenwood (1975) summarizes the literature nicely.  High levels of education are 
consistently among the characteristics of a person that make him more likely to 
migrate, and this relationship is stronger the longer the distance of the move.  




(1988) examines migration patterns across census regions by education.  He finds that 
New England is a net exporter of college-educated individuals while the West Coast 
is a net importer. 
A related literature examines wage and population adjustments in response to 
local demand shocks.  Topel (1986) uses CPS data from the 1970s to study the effect 
of local demand shocks on worker’s wages and employment.  He finds that local 
demand shocks have the greatest effect on older and less-educated workers who are 
also the least mobile.  Bound and Holzer (2000) expand upon Topel’s finding using 
Census data from 1980 and 1990.  They also find that local demand shocks are most 
strongly felt by the less experienced, less educated and black workers.  Further, 
Bound and Holzer argue that the limited mobility of these groups contributed to the 
well-documented deterioration of their wages over the 1980s. 
Moving beyond describing the patterns of migration in the data, Kennan and 
Walker (2003) estimate a structural model of migration decisions.  They find that 
worker’s migration decisions do seem to be influenced by the potential for higher 
income, or a better locational match.  However, they also find that migration does not 
seem to be influenced by geographic differences in wage distributions.  Therefore, 
worker mobility does not arbitrage the large differences across locations in worker’s 
wages.  Instead of the traditional literature, which has focused more on the numbers 
of workers moving across locations, the authors also measure the cost of mobility off 
of these regional wage differences.  Based on this methodology, they find that the 
average worker would need to be compensated $250,000 in order to induce him to 




i.e. not including variables which explain a worker’s preference for his current 
location, the results are suggestive of the frictions that exist in worker movement 
across geography. 
2.2 Data 
All of the data used in this research are part of the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics program at the Census Bureau.  Information on workers comes 
from the Unemployment Insurance wage records for the selected three states2.  These 
files contain person identifiers that allow one to track a worker’s earnings over the 
available period, from 1991 to 1998.  The data also contain firm identifiers that allow 
for an exact link between the UI files and other data sets.  The UI wage records 
contain virtually all business employment for the states included in the analysis, 
creating a final sample size of 198,644,076 observations representing 37,875,250 
people and 3,989,740 firms.  The disadvantage of using the UI wage data to 
characterize workers is the very limited demographic information available.  Within 
the Census bureau, this problem has been partially overcome by combining the UI 
wage data with other administrative data containing information on date of birth, 
place of birth, and gender.  Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section, the panel aspect of the data allows one to separate out worker and firm 
effects. 
The local labor market throughout this chapter will be defined as county of 
work for the employees.  There is some limited county of residence information also 
                                                 
2 Three states were selected on the basis of time-series availability at the time of project inception.  





available; however, it only provides information for 1999 and forward.  One potential 
drawback in defining local labor market skill by county of work is that by definition 
the measure only includes the working portion of the local labor market.  This issue 
of mismeasurement will only cause problems if unemployment rates are large and the 
distribution of skill among the unemployed varies widely across counties, which 
seems unlikely.  Other geographic information on firms, such as Metropolitan 
Statistical Area, is also available within the dataset used.  The analysis below can 
directly test whether or not there is significant variation of worker skill by county 
within MSAs. 
As mentioned above, the UI wage records contain identifiers for a worker’s 
firm, but not a worker’s establishment.  Without the establishment identifier for each 
of the workers, it becomes difficult to create a measure of local labor market skill, 
which is an aggregation of individual worker skills.  In particular, if a firm has 
establishments in multiple counties, it is impossible to determine to which county to 
assign the worker. While multi-unit firms only represent roughly 30% of employment 
for the states being studied, some algorithm must be used to allocate these workers to 
the correct county. Fortunately, the ES2023 files provide additional information that 
helps to alleviate this problem.  In particular, the ES202 lists all establishments, their 
county location, and the number of employees at each establishment for all of the 
firms.   From this data set, it is possible to assign an employee-weighted county to 
each firm.  While it is impossible to determine which workers are properly assigned, a 
                                                 
3 The ES202 files are part of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 




simple tabulation verifies that this procedure correctly identifies the county of work 
for 91% of the workers4. 
2.3 Characterizing Human Capital 
Due to the limited amount of demographic information available, and in 
particular the lack of information on a worker’s education, worker’s wages are 
decomposed into a worker effect, a firm effect, and a time varying effect as follows 
 
This decomposition of wages is a variation on the methodology developed by 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).  Wages are measured on an annual basis (see 
Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney (2003) for details on construction of this 
variable).  Human capital is captured in the fixed worker effect, θ, and a quadratic in 
experience captured within X.5  Firm characteristics are captured in the time-varying 
firm effect, ψ.6  The remaining variables contained in X are a series of gender by year 
by labor force attachment status dummies.  These variables control for the observable 
time-varying characteristics.  Due to the large sample sizes, the wage equation is 
estimated separately for each state using the conjugate gradient methodology as 
explained in Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002).  The solution algorithm involves 
                                                 
εw Xijt i it j i t s it= + + +θ β ψ
'
( , )
4 The county is known for all workers at single unit firms.  Nearly 70% of workers in the sample are 
employed at single unit firms.  Workers at multi-unit firms are assigned to the county in which the firm 
has the greatest number of employees.  The percentage of workers correctly assigned can then be 
determined by calculating the percentage of workers at the multi-unit that are in the county with the 
greatest employment for that multi-unit. 
5 Experience is equal to the sum of an estimated initial experience and observed experience over the 
sample time period.  Initial experience is equal to age minus imputed years of schooling minus 6.  See 
Abowd, Lengermann, McKinney (2003) for more details. 
6 See section 3.4 for further explanation of the wage decomposition and the decision to use time-




grouping the data into connected groups.  Within each group all but one person and 
firm effect is identified.  In practice, the identification restriction is applied post-
processing by setting the group mean of the person and firm effects equal to zero.  
Results are then pooled together across states weighting by employment in 1992.  The 
worker and firm effects are adjusted by state level mean wages so that they are 
comparable across states. 
The fixed worker effect in this model captures the component of the worker’s 
wages that can be attributed to the worker and reflects any fixed characteristic of the 
worker that affects his wages.  Although no individual level comparison of the worker 
effect and more traditional measures of skill are done in this chapter, Abowd, 
Lengermann, and McKinney (2003) have found that there is a positive correlation 
between the worker effect and years of schooling.  In addition to years of schooling, 
the worker effect should also capture other characteristics of the worker including the 
quality of the college attended, the major chosen, and the success of the student in 
school. 
In addition to separating out the component of wages attributable to the 
worker, this wage decomposition has the additional advantage of controlling for area 
specific fixed effects in the firm effect.  One of the difficulties in comparing a 
worker’s wages across areas is that variation in the cost of labor across local labor 
markets might vary due to varying labor market tightness or cost of living differences.  
Because firms almost never change location, any fixed characteristics of a physical 
location should be captured within the fixed firm effect.  Further, the worker effect is 




workers.  Within the three state sample, an average of 20% of workers in each county 
in 1998 had worked in a different county in 1992.  Any worker at a firm in which at 
least one worker had worked in a different county should have a worker effect 
uncontaminated by the area effect.  Given the high degree of worker mobility in the 
data, most workers should be covered by this condition.  A regression of the firm 
effects on a set of county dummies tests the extent to which regional variation is 
being absorbed in the firm effects.  County dummies explain approximately seven 
percent of the variation in firm effects.  While the county dummies only account for a 
small proportion of the overall variation, seven percent is approximately twice the 
amount of variation that counties explain in similar regressions in which the worker 
effect is the dependent variable. 
While some of the following analysis utilizes the micro data, further analysis 
comparing counties requires a county measure of skill.  Two different measures are 
used extensively throughout the analysis.  The first is a simple average of itθ
)
, the 
estimated worker effect from the wage equation, within the local labor market, 
labeled avgltθ
)
.  The other measure calculates the percentage of workers within the 
local labor market that are above the 75th percentile of the overall pooled three state 
distribution of itθ
)
 for 1992, the reference year.  This alternate measure of local labor 
market skill is labeled 75ltθ
)
.  As shown in the results, these two measures capture 
different aspects of the skill distribution. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results of estimating the wage equation with limited 
time varying firm effects.  Looking across the first row, the correlation of log wage 




results suggest that worker and firm effects are equally important in explaining the 
variation in log wages.  The covariance between the worker and firm effects at the 
individual level is positive, although small in magnitude at 0.07.  The positive 
covariance between worker and firm effects suggests that high skill workers are more 
likely to be at employed at high wage firms.   
Table 2.1: Results from Wage Regression 
 
Log wage Worker effect Firm effect XBeta Residual
Log wage 1 0.5643 0.4958 0.2294 0.4207
Worker effect 1 0.0655 -0.4740 0.0000
Firm effect 1 0.0355 0.0000
XBeta 1 0.0000
Residual 1  
2.4 Distribution of Worker Skill across Counties 
Using the results from the wage decomposition above, table 2.2 explores the 
variation in the person effects across counties, metro areas, and industries.  The basic 
equation being estimated across the columns is some variant of 
   itnlilmnt εγγαθ +++=  
where lγ  are the set of county dummies, and nγ  are the set of two digit industry 
dummies.  The first set of columns in the table are the p-value and R-squared from a 
series of regressions of the worker effects on the county dummies alone, separately 
for each year in the data.  Over the sample time period, there is statistically significant 
variation in the worker effect across counties.  While the variation is significant, the 
county dummies explain only between 2 and 4% of the overall variation in the worker 
effect.  These results are not surprising given that within any given county there is 




Table 2.2: Regress θi on county, and county and 2-digit industry dummies, by year 
 
p-value R-Squared p-value R-squared
1992 county 0.0001 0.0374 0.0001 0.0656
ind 0.0001
1993 county 0.0001 0.0357 0.0001 0.0635
ind 0.0001
1994 county 0.0001 0.0337 0.0001 0.0611
ind 0.0001
1995 county 0.0001 0.0311 0.0001 0.0580
ind 0.0001
1996 county 0.0001 0.0284 0.0001 0.0555
ind 0.0001
1997 county 0.0001 0.0260 0.0001 0.0524
ind 0.0001




Somewhat more difficult to explain is the pattern of decreasing R-squared 
values over time.  While in 1992 counties explain 3.7% of the variation in the worker 
effect, by 1998 counties explain only 2.3% of the variation.  This fact alone would 
suggest that the concentration of like workers into counties is decreasing over time.  
However, this result may also be driven by the methodology used to quantify worker 
skill.  Given that the worker effect is fixed over for a given worker, the only changes 
over time in the overall distribution of the worker effects will arise from exiters and 
entrants.  Over the 1990s the labor market grew increasingly strong for workers.  
Therefore, it is possible that new entrants later in the time period have measured 
worker effects that still capture, in part, their inherent skill, but that also capture their 
labor market luck.  Extension of the time period into the next decade would allow one 




The focus throughout the chapter is on the location of workers by county, 
even though much of the literature on local labor markets uses the metropolitan area 
as the relevant geographic measure.  Because counties nest into metropolitan areas, it 
is possible to test whether or not there is significant variation in county skill within 
metro areas by testing for equality of the coefficients on county dummies for counties 
within metro areas.  In the sample, 15 of the 40 metropolitan areas are composed of 
multiple counties.  Tests of equality of the county coefficients are rejected in all of 
these 15 metro areas.  These results suggest that there is significant variation in 
county skill within metro areas. 
Finally, the second set of columns explore a regression of the worker effect on 
both county and industry dummies.  These regressions begin to address the concern 
that geographic variation in worker skills is primarily due to variation in the industry 
mix across geography.  The direction of causality between firm location and worker 
location is uncertain.  Firms of the same industry may choose a location based on 
access to transportation, input markets or output markets, and workers may follow 
firms in order to have access to the jobs they provide.  It is also possible that workers 
make location decisions based on amenities such as proximity to facilities of higher 
education and that firms choose to locate near these workers in order to have access 
to the highly skilled labor pool.  Determining the comparative importance of these 
two theories on worker location is beyond the scope of this chapter.  However, the 
extent to which worker location is determined by industry mix is important to many 
of the theories that rely on geographic variation in worker skills.  While the skill mix 




is completely determined by the industry mix, identification of the effects of skill mix 
on other worker or firm characteristics will be difficult to achieve. 
The second set of columns in table 2.2 begins to address these concerns by 
testing if county dummies account for a statistically significant amount of skill 
variation after controlling for industry mix.  As is clear from the p-values, county 
dummies are still significant in these regressions.  Industry dummies are also highly 
significant and the R-squared is much larger with the inclusion of industry dummies.  
While industry is clearly important in explaining variation in skill, there still remains 
a role for geographic variation. 
2.5 Distribution of County Skill 
 While the first two tables concentrated on the micro data and the extent to 
which counties can explain variation in skill, the main focus of this chapter is on how 
counties vary in skill mix.  As mentioned above, two county level measures of skill 
are computed.  The first measure is the percentage of workers in a county who are 
above the 75th percentile of the overall distribution of worker skill.  The second 
measure is the simple average of worker skill within a county.  Summary statistics of 
both county skill measures are in table 2.3.  The first set of columns shows that the 
average percentage of workers in the top quartile of the distribution by county is 20% 
in 1992 and increases to 25% in 1998.  The increase in county skill over the time 
period as measured by the fixed worker effect is due to a combination of the exit of 
less skilled workers and the entry of more skilled workers over the time period.  
County skill may also be increasing if skilled workers move from larger to smaller 




Because the reported average is not adjusted by county population, the average 
percentage in the top quartile below 25% reflects the fact that larger counties have 
more skilled workers.  The pattern in county skill measured as the average of the 
worker effect within the county is similar.  One additional pattern shows up in the 
second measure, however.  The standard deviation of county skill is decreasing over 
the time period suggesting that counties are becoming more alike over time.  In 
addition to the skill measures, table 3 also includes yearly means and standard 
deviations of the number of workers in the counties.  Average county size increases 
monotonically, while the standard deviation of county size increases over the time 
period in a non-monotonic fashion. 




year mean sd mean sd mean sd
1992 0.1999 0.0470 -0.1929 0.1119 99712 397476
1993 0.2083 0.0482 -0.1665 0.1127 99075 391473
1994 0.2163 0.0481 -0.1475 0.1120 100637 395591
1995 0.2246 0.0483 -0.1243 0.1062 102105 394539
1996 0.2327 0.0483 -0.1061 0.1036 104429 402364
1997 0.2419 0.0478 -0.0849 0.0997 107168 412440
Top quartile skill Average skill Number of workers
1 2 3
 
In order to focus more on the entire distribution of county skill, kernel 
densities are estimated for each of the skill measures.  The kernel density estimate is 
computed using 


















where n is the number of observations, h is the bandwidth, Xi is the skill measure and 




distribution of county skill measured by the percentage of workers in the county who 
are in the top quartile.  The solid line represents the distribution in 1991, long dashes 
represent the distribution in 1995, and the small dashes represents the distribution in 
1998.  The density emphasizes the tremendous variation in county skill.  In 1991, the 
least skilled county had 10% of its workforce in the top quartile while the most 
skilled county had 33% of its workforce in the top quartile.  The distributions appear 
to be bi-modal with a second higher skilled mode being much smaller than the first.  
Formal tests of bi-modality are performed latter in the chapter.  Comparing the 
densities across the three years represented, all counties are becoming more skilled 
over time.  Figure 2.2 repeats the same three densities this time weighting each 
county by the number of workers in the county in that year.  While the overall shape 
of the distribution still appears to be bi-modal, the location of the modes is shifted to 
the right.  Comparisons of Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 make clear the point made earlier 























Distribution of county skill
 























 Figure 2.3 repeats the exercise in figure 2.1 for the other measure of county 
skill, the average of the worker effect in the county.  This distribution does not appear 
to be bi-modal but still maintains the overall shape of a large mode in the left half of 
the distribution and a long right tail.  Additionally, the distribution appears to become 
more concentrated over time as the mode both becomes larger and narrower.  Figure 
2.4 is the worker-weighted version of figure 2.3.  Again, the correlation between 
county size and skill is clear as the weighted distribution moves strongly to the right.   










































Distribution of county skill, weighted
 
 
2.5.1 Tests For Bimodality 
As mentioned above, the densities of county skill measured by the top quartile 
appear to be bi-modal.  A bi-modal density suggests that the underlying density is 
composed of two distinct densities with well-separated means.7  In the context of 
county skill, this implies that within the overall distribution there are two distinct 
types of counties, high skill and low skill.  Evidence of bimodality would therefore 
suggest that not only is there a large amount of variation in county skill, but counties 
tend to fall into one of two distinct types.   
                                                 
7 See Bianchi (1997) for a similar discussion related to the distribution of per-capita GDP in a cross-




Visual inspection of figures 2.1 and 2.2 would lead one to believe that the 
distribution of county skill is indeed bi-modal.  However, the existence of multiple 
modes in a kernel density estimate depends critically on the bandwidth, h, chosen.  
While a bandwidth can be optimally chosen by a variety of different rules, there is no 
test statistic for the bandwidth and therefore no direct test statistic for multiple modes.  
Silverman (1981) proposes a test for multi-modality based on the relationship 
between bandwidth and multi-modality that utilizes smoothed bootstrapping.  Under 
the null hypothesis that the density has at most one mode and the alternate hypothesis 
that the density has more than one mode, the critical bandwidth, , is defined as 
the minimum bandwidth under which the density has at most one mode.  If the true 
underlying density is multimodal, it will require a large critical bandwidth value to 
smooth a multimodal density into a unimodal density estimate.  Therefore, the test 
calculates the critical bandwidth value for each smoothed bootstrap sample, and the 








⋅   
where  is the estimated critical bandwidth for 1 mode and is the critical 
bandwidth for one mode estimated from the smoothed bootstrap sample drawn from 
the rescaled density estimate, .  The test is based off of a rescaled density 
estimate, , as opposed to the estimated null distribution , in order to 
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 Applying the above test to the county skill densities, figure 2.5 and 2.6 
calculate the relationship between bandwidth and number of modes in 1992 and 1998 
using the percentage of workers in the top quartile as the measure of county skill.  As 
is clear in the graphs, as the bandwidth becomes larger, the number of modes 
becomes smaller.  The critical bandwidth is, as mentioned above, the smallest value 
of the bandwidth that produces a given number of modes.  For test purposes here, the 
focus is on testing the null of at most one mode and at most two modes, versus the 
alternate hypotheses of more than one mode and more than two modes respectively.  
Tests for sequentially larger number of modes can be considered in sequence.  The 
associated achieved significance levels, or p-values, are shown in table 2.4.  The tests 
are performed separately for each successive year of the data.  Looking at the results 
in the first column, the null of at most one mode can be rejected at the 10% level in 
all years and at the 5% level in three out of the eight years.  The null of at most two 
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Table 2.4: Test for multimodality 
p-value for h0: k modes, h1: > k modes 








1998 0.083 0.649  
 The data clearly suggest that the distribution of county skill is bi-modal   
There is no clear time-series pattern to the significance level of the bi-modal test, so 
there is no evidence that the two types of counties are converging or diverging over 
the 8 year time period covered by the sample.  Expanding this research to longer time 
periods, for example across decades using Census data, would be an interesting 
extension.  Still, the evidence composed here is strongly suggestive of two distinct 
types of counties, thereby suggesting a potentially large role for county skill in 
explaining other economic facts. 
2.6 Comparisons with 1990 Census Data 
Because the measures of skill used throughout this chapter are non-standard, it 
is useful to compare the skill measures computed with LEHD data with more 
traditional skill measures.  In particular, a common proxy for skill is education.  The 
two main data exercises above, exploring the extent to which geography explains 
variation in skill and examining the distribution of county skill measures, can be 
replicated using information on worker education using the 100% sample of the long 




rest of the literature, worker skill is equated with having a college degree.  The 
college graduate dummy variable is regressed on county dummies in column 1 of 
table 2.5.  As in table 2.2, there is significant variation in worker education by county.  
The R-squared of 0.0235 is also consistent with the earlier results.  In column 2 the 
specification includes metro areas, and again both the county and metro area 
dummies remain significant, suggesting variation in the college worker mix of 
counties within metro areas.  Finally, the specification in column 3 adds industry 
dummies.  As before, both the industry dummies and the county dummies remain 
significant.  However, with college graduation as the measure of worker skill, the R-
squared on the regression is much larger at 0.1729 in the new specification and an 
average of 0.06 in the regressions of table 2.  Clearly, college education varies more 
across industries than does the worker effect.   
Table 2.5: OLS of college grad on county, county*metro and metro, and county and 
industry dummies using PUMS 1990 
 
p-value R-Squared p-value R-squared p-value R-squared





While the worker effect is capturing much of the same thing as the existence 
of a college degree, there are some important differences.  In particular, the worker 
effect is all of the component of a worker’s wages that remains with the worker as he 
switches firms.  In theory, the worker effect should capture characteristics of the 
worker that are valued in the labor market.  In addition to education, it is likely that 
these characteristics would include ability, quality of education, etc.  What the worker 




One explanation of the difference between the two dependent variables is that the 
sorting across industries may be more closely related to education than unobservable 
worker skills. 
 In order to compute a county level skill measure analogous to the percentage 
of workers in the top quartile, the percentage of workers with a college degree is 
calculated for each county in the LEHD sample using the Census of Population.  
Panels A and B of table 2.6 provide two comparisons between the Census measure 
and the LEHD measure of county skill.  Because the Decennial Census is only 
available for years ending in zero and only two out of the three states in the LEHD 
sample have 1990 data, it is not possible to directly compare the full LEHD sample 
used here and the Census for the same year.  Therefore, two separate comparisons are 
made. Panel A has correlations between the percentage of college graduates in the 
1990 Census and the percentage of workers in the top quartile of worker skill in the 
two states available in 1990 in the LEHD data.  In panel B, the 1990 percentage of 
college graduates is compared with the county skill measure calculated from LEHD 
data using the three states in the LEHD data in 1991.  Results across the two tables 
are very similar.  The percentage of college graduates is highly correlated with both 
of the measures of county skill constructed from the LEHD data in either year the 




Table 2.6: Comparing Census Data and LEHD Data 
 
Panel A: Comparing 1990 Census data with 1990 LEHD data, two states 
% College grad. Top quartile skill Average skill
% College grad. 1 0.7312 0.7210
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Top quartile skill 1 0.9297
(0.0000)
Average skill 1  
P-values in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Comparing 1990 Census data with 1991 LEHD data, three states 
% College grad. Top quartile skill Average skill
% College grad. 1 0.7544 0.7920
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Top quartile skill 1 0.9482
(0.0000)
Average skill 1  
P-values in parentheses. 
 
In addition to the simple correlations, figure 2.7 displays kernel density 
estimates of the 1990 Census skill measure, the top quartile skill measure using 1990 
LEHD data, and the top quartile skill measure using 1991 LEHD data.  All three 
densities have similar shapes with a large mode in the left part of the density and a 
long right tail.  The bimodality found in the LEHD data does not seem as prominent 
in the Census data, although there does appear to be a second smaller mode in the 
Census data.  Considering that these two measures of county skill are constructed 
from different datasets, using different methodology and different measures of skill, 
the high level of correlation and similarity between the two datasets is remarkable.  
This evidence suggests that using the LEHD data will lead to similar conclusions on 
the geographic distribution of skill as using the Census.  Additionally, the main 




provides both in its near universe of workers and in the availability of data on an 
annual basis. 
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2.7 Persistence in County Skill 
 In addition to studying the distribution of county skill at different points in 
time, evidence on the persistence of county skill is an important aspect in the 
argument of why geography matters in studying skilled workers.  Other researchers 
have documented the high levels of mobility of skilled workers.  If skilled workers 
are highly mobile, the skill level of a local labor market may be a transient feature, 




would need to account for the possibility that their effect is also temporary.  The 
LEHD data are particularly well suited to studying counties over medium-run time 
frames due to the high frequency of the data. 
 Before looking at the county level skill measures over time, looking at firm 
level skill over time allows for a decomposition to give insight into the activity of 
workers and firms that compose the final measures.  Figure 2.8 is composed of a 1% 
sample of all firms and, for each firm in the sample, measures the percentage of 
workers in the top quartile of the overall distribution in two adjacent years.  The x-
axis measures the 1991 value while the y-axis is the 1992 value.  In addition, the thin 
black line is the 45-degree line while the thick gray line is the fitted value from a 
regression of the 1992 value on the 1991 value.  As is clear from the picture, there is a 
tremendous amount of variation in the skill mix of firms.  At one extreme, there are a 
cluster of firms in which there are no top quartile workers in either period, and a 
smaller number of firms in which the entire firm is composed of top quartile workers.  
In between the two extremes, the majority of the observations cluster around the 45-
degree line, providing evidence that over the short time horizon there is not much 
movement in firm skill.  In contrast, figure 2.9 plots firm skill in 1991 and 1998.  
Over this longer time horizon, the clustering of firms around the 45-degree line is less 
pronounced.  In addition, the slope of the fitted line is much less steep than the 45-




Figure 2.8: Firm level skill, 1991-1992 
 
 





 Figures 2.10 and 2.11 replicate the same two graphs using county level skill 
measures, in particular the percentage of workers in a county who are in the top 
quartile of the overall worker effect distribution.  The most striking difference 
between the two sets of graphs is much smaller variation across units and the tighter 
concentration around the 45-degree line.  Given that counties are composed of, on 
average, thousands of employees while firms are much smaller, this pattern is to be 
expected.  Despite the relatively high amounts of movement in the skill mix of firms, 
the county level measures remain remarkably persistent.  In figure 2.10, the 45-degree 
line and the fitted line are nearly indistinguishable.  Over the longer time period, 
shown in figure 2.11, the parallel shift of the fitted line above the 45-degree line 
provides evidence that all of the counties are becoming more skilled at a nearly 




Figure 2.10: County level skill, 1991-1992 
 
 





 Panels A and B of table 2.7 provide more detailed evidence on the movement 
of counties across different quartiles in the county skill distribution by looking at 
transition matrices of counties.  The rows divide counties into a skill quartile based on 
their t skill level.  The columns divide counties into a skill quartile based on their t+1 
skill level.  Panel A was created by computing a year-to-year transition matrix (t to 
t+1) and taking the average of each of the cells (t=1992 to 1997).  The 1,1 cell 
therefore shows that on average from 1992 to 1998, 89% of counties in the bottom 
quartile in year t are in the bottom quartile in year t+1.  On the opposite end of the 
spectrum the 4,4 cell shows that 95% of counties in the top quartile of the skill 
distribution in year t are in the top quartile in year t+1.  Not only is the position of 
counties among the relative skill distribution persistent over time, but the more highly 
skilled counties are more persistent than the less skilled counties.  Panel B measures 
the long-range transition matrix looking at county’s relative skill ranking in 1992 and 
1998.  Again, the persistence in the bottom quartile of the skill distribution is much 




Table 2.7: County transition matrices 
 
A: Year to year transitions in quartile position, averaging 1992-1993 through 1997-
1998 
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 89.13 10.34 1.07 0.00
2nd 11.05 78.79 9.98 0.36
3rd 0.36 11.05 85.92 3.21
4th 0.00 0.36 3.57 94.83  
 
B: Long-range transitions in quartile position, 1992-1998 
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 68.45 27.81 4.28 0.00
2nd 29.95 47.06 21.39 0.00
3rd 0.00 25.67 64.17 10.70
4th 2.14 0.00 10.70 87.70  
 
 Given the well-studied high mobility of skilled workers, these results on the 
high levels of county skill persistence may initially seem surprising.  However, the 
two facts are not inconsistent.  These results suggest that although highly skilled 
workers may be mobile, they relocate in ways that reinforce the overall distribution of 
county skill.  The next section begins to explore this hypothesis. 
2.8 Distribution of Workers within Counties 
In order to better understand why county skill is persistent given the high 
mobility of workers, figures 2.12 and 2.13 look at the distribution of workers by skill 
within counties that have been classified as high or low skill.  Low skill counties are 
defined as those in the bottom third of the county skill distribution, with less than 
17.5% of workers in the top quartile.  Similarly, high skill counties are defined as 
those in the top third of the county skill distribution, with more than 21.2% of 




these two types of counties in 1992.  The distribution of workers within low skill 
counties is on the left, while the distribution of workers within high skill counties is 
on the right.  While the relative position of the two distributions are determined by the 
cutoffs used to define them, the shape of the distributions provides more precise 
evidence as to what is different about high skill counties.  The mode in the 
distribution of workers in high skill counties is both narrower and higher, suggesting 
that the distribution of workers in high skill counties has a much lower variance.  
Table 2.8 provides further evidence supporting this observation.  Correlations 
between the mean or median and three different measures of within county skill 
dispersion show that higher skill counties have much lower variation in the top end of 
the distribution.  Figure 2.13 and panel B of table 2.8 repeat these exercises for 1998 
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Table 2.8: Within county correlation of mean/median with dispersion measures 
 
Panel A: 1992 
 
90-10 50-10 90-50
mean -0.2624 -0.0599 -0.4812
0.0003 0.4196 0.0001
median -0.1390 0.1122 -0.5093
0.0599 0.1293 0.0001  
 
Panel B: 1998 
90-10 50-10 90-50
mean -0.2132 0.0050 -0.4528
0.0037 0.9464 0.0001
median -0.0947 0.1841 -0.4829
0.2011 0.0124 0.0001  
 
 These results suggest that the primary difference between high and low skill 
counties is in the upper end of the within county skill distribution.  All counties have 
significant numbers of low skill workers, but high skill counties have high 
concentrations of the most highly skilled workers.  As table 2.8 demonstrates, there is 
no significant correlation between mean or median county skill and dispersion in the 
bottom half of the within county skill distribution.  The overall correlation between 
mean or median skill and the amount of dispersion within county skill is driven by the 
upper half of the distribution.  As the final column of both panels of table 2.8 show, 
the correlation between mean or median and the 90-50 within county skill differential 
is both large and highly significant. 
 Figures 2.14 through 2.16 further connect the mix of workers with the 
distribution of county skill by decomposing changes in the distribution of workers by 




the changing skill of counties.  In the 1992 sample, 45% of workers are in the same 
county in 1998, 34% of the workers exit the sample by 1998, and 21% are in the 
sample in both years, but in different counties.  The different graphs focus on a 
different group of workers and their distribution by county skill.  Figure 2.14 looks at 
continuers, figure 2.15 looks at exiters and entrants, and figure 2.16 looks at movers 
by county skill.  Each of these graphs is equivalent to looking at one group of workers 
in the weighted kernel density estimates for the whole sample as shown in figure 2.2.  
In figure 2.14, the focus is on continuers, and the figure shows the effect of the 
changing skill of counties by showing the distribution of the continuers with the 1992 
and 1998 county skill level.  In figure 2.15, the focus is on entrants and exiters, 
therefore the two densities are composed of two separate samples of workers.   In 
panel A, differences between the two densities are due to exiters leaving different 
counties than that which entrants choose to enter.  In panel B, the change in the shape 
of the density is due both to exiters leaving different counties than those entrants 
enter, and to the changing skill of counties.  Similarly, in figure 2.16, the focus is on 
movers, and, while the sample of workers is identical in the 1992 and 1998 density, 
the differences between the shape of the two densities in panel A is due to the net 
movement of workers across counties, while in panel B the differences are due to 
both the net movement of workers across counties and the counties’ skill levels 
changing. 
 Figure 2.14 makes clear that the large number of continuers and the similarity 
in their county skill in 1992 and 1998 accounts for a large part of persistence in 




upskilling occurring across all counties as shown in earlier figures.  As before, the 
distribution is of a similar shape but shifted to the right.  The first mode appears to 
shrink while the second mode is larger in 1998.  Figure 2.15 shows the contribution 
of entry and exit to the persistence in county skill.  Entry and exit is due in part to 
workers entering and leaving the labor force and in part due to workers moving in and 
out of the sample of states being studied.  Again, in panel A, their distribution in 1992 
and 1998, holding county skill constant at its 1992 level, is very similar.  It appears 
that entrants are slightly more likely to enter more highly skilled counties.  In panel 
B, the changing skill of counties has much the same effect that it did among the 
continuers with a smaller first mode and a larger second mode.   
Figure 2.14: Distribution of continuers by county skill 






.15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4
County skill







Figure 2.15: Distribution of entrants and exiters by county skill 
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Figure 2.15 shows the contribution of movers to the persistence in county 
skill.  This group is composed of workers in one county in 1992 and in a different 
county in 1998.  A fraction of these moves are likely endogenous switches to a better 




separations at their last job and found employment in a new county.  Unfortunately, 
the data does not provide any direct information that can determine the relative 
importance of these two different motivations behind moves9.  Given that a fraction 
of the moves were likely endogenous, the similarity between the two distributions in 
panel A is striking.  The 1998 peak is slightly lower than the 1992 peak, and there is 
more mass in the far right of the distribution in 1998.  These differences suggest that 
some fraction of the workers is moving from less to more skilled counties.  These 
patterns are also reinforced in panel B.  Similar to the panel B in the two earlier 
figures, the distribution in 1998 is shifted to the right.  In figure 15, the shape of the 
distribution changes a bit more between the two years.  However, these differences 
are relatively small, and therefore even the mobile workers contribute to the 
persistence in county skill.  These figures suggest that worker mobility had little 
impact on the changing distribution of county’s skills, but that changes in the 
distribution of county’s skills were important. 
                                                 
9 In chapter 4, a sample of movers who were likely to have left their left job exogenously is determined 




Figure 2.16: Distribution of movers by county skill 
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2.9 Conclusion 
 Many papers in various strands of economics focus on the effect that skilled 
labor has on technology, wages, productivity, and other worker and firm outcomes.  
Despite this focus on skilled labor not much attention has been placed on the 




filling that gap.  Not only are there significant differences in the availability of skilled 
labor across geography, but also these differences persist over time despite the high 
levels of mobility among workers.  While this chapter focuses on changes over the 





Chapter 3: Endogenous Technology and Local Labor Market 
Skill 
 
Despite the focus on the effect of new technologies and highly skilled workers 
in contributing to economic growth and explaining increasing wage inequality, the 
use of these new technologies and workers is not necessarily widespread.   In fact, if 
one looks at firm level data, it becomes clear that while many firms do appear to be 
utilizing the latest technologies and most highly skilled workforces, there are also 
many firms who have not adopted the latest technologies and who have de-skilled 
their workforce.  While the overall trends, particularly in the 1980s, seemed to favor 
the use of more educated workers, there is heterogeneity behind that trend.  What is 
generating this heterogeneity?  This chapter proposes one answer: the highly skilled 
workforce necessary to implement the latest technologies is an input into production 
that is very different from capital or materials.  The focus on the availability of skilled 
labor leading to endogenous technology is not new in the economics literature.10  
However, while previous studies of this phenomenon have focused on macro-level 
changes in the relative supply and demand of skilled labor, this chapter utilizes 
variation in the availability of skilled labor across local labor markets to determine if 
otherwise similar firms invest differently in high technology capital depending upon 
the locally available skill mix.    
Because firms must often decide how they would like to conduct their 
business before they know whom they may be able to hire, they must make their 
investment decisions based on the type of worker that they expect to be able to hire.  
                                                 




Workers, while mobile, tend to locate near other similar workers, thereby limiting the 
ability of a firm in a low skill area to attract a high skill workforce.  Firms who 
attempt to recruit more skilled workers potentially face large search costs both in 
recruiting workers and in the cost of having capital lay idle.  The model constructed 
captures these ideas and provides a framework for the later empirical work.  The 
model is a two-period matching model based on Acemoglu (1996).  In the first 
period, firms know the distribution of workers in their local labor market, but not the 
worker with whom they will match.  Based on this information and their knowledge 
of their firm type, firms make an investment decision.  Worker skill is predetermined 
in the model.  In the second period, workers and firms meet and production takes 
place.  This model sets up the two key equations for estimation: a wage equation and 
an investment equation.  The wage equation takes advantage of a large data set and 
helps to quantify worker and firm heterogeneity.  The investment equation uses 
results from the wage equation in combination with other firm data to directly address 
the question laid out above: Do firms consider the skill mix of the local labor market 
before making a technology investment decision? 
The key difference between this research and the existing endogenous 
technology literature is that this chapter exploits variation in a firm’s investment 
decisions in a single cross section, while previous research has focused on time series 
trends in the development and implementation of new technologies.  Identification in 
the cross section of the effect of local labor market skill on the decisions of firms is 
complicated by the fact that the location decisions of both firms and workers are 




exogenous technological shock, the growth of computer technology between the early 
1980s and 1990s.  The average establishment in the sample used in the empirical 
work is greater than 10 years old and therefore made its location decision over 10 
years ago, based on the technologies and local labor market skill available at that 
time.  In the ten years between when the average firm made its location decision and 
the cross section in 1992 in which computer investment data is available, computer 
investment per worker at manufacturing establishments increased by a factor of 20.  
In contrast, the skill mix of the local labor market remains persistent over time.  The 
introduction of a new technology to a set of older firms allows for identification of 
the effect on labor market skill on firm’s investment decision. 
 The data needed to address this question empirically require detailed 
knowledge on firms, workers, and their interaction.  For establishments, information 
on firm type, the amount and type of investment, and location is needed.  On the 
worker side, one must know the skill level of all employees in a local labor market 
and the skill level at each establishment.  A newly developed linked employer-
employee data set available at the Census Bureau makes this research possible.  State 
level universe files containing employers and employees allow one to decompose 
wages into an explained component due to observable time-varying worker 
characteristics, a fixed worker heterogeneity term, and a firm heterogeneity term.  
This, in combination with links to the 1992 Census of Manufactures, which provides 
information on establishment level investment, makes it possible to answer the 
question set out earlier.  Estimates of the effect of endogenous technology predict that 




10% increase in technology investment.  These results are robust to a series of 
different specifications including different measures of investment, local labor market 
skill, and definitions of the local labor market. 
3.1 Background 
3.1.2 Endogenous Technology 
In the late 1970s, the United States saw a large increase in the relative number 
of college graduates.  Traditional factor-demand analysis would suggest that this 
would be followed by a decrease in the relative wage of skilled workers.  On the 
contrary, throughout the 1980s there was an increase in the price paid for college 
educated workers.  Researchers studying the increased wages paid to more skilled 
workers have considered many possible explanations including shifts in demand and 
the effects of trade.  Focusing here on the former of the possible explanations, the use 
of skill biased technology increased the demand for skilled workers faster than the 
supply of skilled workers was growing, thereby leading to a rise in wages for highly 
skilled workers while their numbers were also increasing.   
Endogenous technology provides a link between these two events.  In reaction 
to the increase in the availability of more skilled workers, businesses began investing 
more in technologies to utilize this newly available human capital.  Models have 
incorporated this endogenous technology choice in different ways.  Acemoglu (1998) 
and Kiley (1999) set up models in which the economy has two sectors, research and 
production.  The research sector chooses to develop the technologies that will 
command a high price and that will be demanded by a large number of firms in the 




1970s, therefore, increased the number of production firms that could potentially use 
skill-biased technology.   The research sector’s incentives shifted as the supply of 
skilled workers increased.  As more skill-biased technologies became available, more 
production firms utilized these technologies, and simultaneously demanded more 
skilled workers. 
 A similar set of models (Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), 
Eudey and Molico (2001)) relies on the fact that firms must commit to a type of 
investment before meeting workers.  Each of the above papers assumes that there are 
two types of vacancies defined by their technology, and two types of workers defined 
by skill.  Firms decide which type of vacancy to create by determining the probability 
of meeting a worker appropriate to that technology.  The types of vacancies created 
by firms critically depend upon the skill mix of the workforce.  A workforce with a 
mix of high skill and low skill workers leads to a pooling equilibrium in which only 
one type of vacancy is created, while a workforce with a greater proportion of skilled 
workers will lead to a separating equilibrium with some vacancies specifically created 
for high skill workers.  These papers then study the effects these different equilibria 
have on either wage inequality or productivity within the economy.  A similar model 
with a continuum of skilled vacancies, defined by amount of technology investment, 
is developed below. 
3.1.2 Firm Heterogeneity 
Beyond the previous theoretical research on endogenous technology, there is 
also a fair amount of empirical evidence that firms exercise a choice in the type of 




set to that used here, look at worker characteristics within firms over time.  They find 
considerable heterogeneity across firms in their choice of worker mix even after 
controlling for detailed industry and other observable firm characteristics.  In 
addition, these firm differences persist over time, suggesting that they are the result of 
a firm choice and not the result of error on the part of the firm or noise in the data.  
Abowd, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Sandusky (2001), again using similar data, look at 
the connections between worker characteristics and firm characteristics.  In their 
analysis of Illinois over the 1990s, they find in a cross sectional analysis that firms 
with greater levels of technology also have more skilled workforces, and that over 
time, firms that increase their use of technology also increase their use of skilled 
workers. 
 Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) look jointly at worker skill, 
workplace organization, and technology investment.  In their work, they find that 
firms that invest heavily in information technology not only have more highly skilled 
workforces, but additionally they have less centralized workplace organizations.  The 
combination of all three of these factors suggests that a firm deciding to invest in high 
technology must also be willing to invest heavily in changing its workforce to fully 
take advantage of the new technology.  Among their most interesting results, as it 
pertains to the research set out here, is a regression of log output on labor, capital and 
a series of four dummies: firms with both high technology and high worker skill, high 
technology but low worker skill, low technology and high worker skill, and finally 
low technology and low worker skill.  Not surprisingly, the dummy for the high-high 




largest coefficient.  These results provide further evidence that firms have a viable 
alternative to doing business using the latest technology.  A combination of workers 
and capital that complements each other has higher productivity than either using new 
technology or highly skilled workers singly. 
 In addition to the cross-sectional heterogeneity in technology usage mentioned 
above, the time-series variation in relative technology-skill complementarity 
highlights the point that it is not necessarily optimal for all firms to be using a high 
skill/high technology mix.  Goldin and Katz (1998) examine the evolution of 
technology-skill complementarity and find that while more recent advances in 
technology have been skill biased, new technologies adopted in the 19th century were, 
in fact, biased toward unskilled labor.  The shift from artisanal shops to factories 
using assembly lines may have been an advance in technology, but it certainly 
involved a reduction in the amount of skilled labor required.  They argue that, 
although skilled labor and capital are complements within the implementation and 
maintenance of a given technology, they may be complements or substitutes among 
different technologies. 
3.1.3 Local Labor Markets 
Finally, a couple of papers study different aspects of the relationship between 
local labor market characteristics and firm characteristics.  Moretti (2002) estimates 
establishment production functions including the change in the college share outside 
of the establishment’s industry to identify the extent of human capital spillovers.  In 
order to control for various unobservable factors that might influence both 




market, Moretti controls for plant, industry by year, and state by year fixed effects.  
Therefore, identification of the human capital spillovers comes from changes in the 
college share variable that are correlated with changes in productivity for 
establishments that survive from 1982 to 1992.  Moretti finds that human capital 
spillovers are responsible for a 0.1% increase in output per year during the 1980s.  
The key difference between Moretti’s model and the one outlined here is that, in 
Moretti’s model, it is assumed that firms and workers are perfectly mobile.  Variation 
in the amount of human capital spillovers across areas continues to exist in 
equilibrium due to variation in the price of the untraded good, land.  In the model 
below, variation across local labor markets is driven by the limited mobility of 
workers and establishments.  In his empirical work, Moretti also relies on a different 
data source in which it is impossible to control for the skill of the firm’s workers. 
Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2003) study the relationship between local 
labor market worker mobility and characteristics of agglomeration economies and of 
Silicon Valley in particular.  They note that one key aspect of Silicon Valley that 
makes it different than other examples of agglomeration economies is the existence of 
a California law that makes it impossible for employers to enforce non-compete 
agreements.  This law, in combination with the modularity of technology being 
developed in Silicon Valley, has led to knowledge spillovers via unusually high 
mobility of workers between establishments.  Their results suggest that Silicon Valley 
may be a special case of endogenous technology due to the exceptionally common 




3.2 The Model 
The endogenous technology model developed here is a two period matching 
model similar to Acemoglu (1996).  While Acemoglu’s model focuses on social 
increasing returns to human capital, the search frictions in the labor market within his 
model can also be shown to lead to endogenous technology.  Within the model 
developed here, the economy consists of a single autonomous local labor market and 
exists for two periods.  While a full model of this economy would include multiple 
local labor markets and would allow for endogenous worker and firm mobility, here 
the larger economy can be thought of consisting of many local labor markets 
operating independently of one another.   Workers vary in their skill level and are 
exogenously distributed across local labor markets.  An individual worker’s skill level 
is determined outside the model.  This suggests that workers cannot adjust their skill 
level within the time frame of a firm choosing its investment level, i.e. a worker with 
a high school degree cannot obtain a college degree in the time that a firm requires to 
choose and implement new technology.  For simplicity in exposition, there are only 
two types of worker skill in the model, a high skill level and a low skill level.  
Extending the model to a continuum of skill types would not affect any of the 
important results of the model.  Firms vary in their predetermined type and in the 
amount of their capital investment.  There is a fixed marginal cost of capital equal to 
µ .  Each firm employs only one worker. 
The basic timing of the model is as follows.  In period one, firms observe the 
distribution of workers in their local labor market, but do not know the type of worker 




second period, firms and workers are randomly matched to each other.  Firms and 
workers must decide whether to continue with the match and produce or to remain 
idle for the period.  Search costs create quasi-rents for the firm and worker within the 
match.  If production takes place, returns to workers and firms are determined via a 
Nash bargaining solution.  Workers receive a fraction B of match surplus and firms 
receive 1-B.  Match surplus is equivalent to output in this model because the firm’s 
first period investment is a sunk cost.  Both workers and firms have zero opportunity 
cost, and it is assumed that output is nonnegative, implying that workers and firms 
will accept any division of match surplus and production will occur with all matches.  
Within this model, the Nash bargaining solution can be shown to be a general 
solution.  The specific case in which B is equal to α , labor’s share of income under 
constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas production, is equivalent to assuming that 
factors receive their marginal product.  
Production takes place in worker/firm pairs 
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where α  is a value between 0 and 1, hi is worker type i’s human capital, kj is 
firm j’s capital investment, and Aj is firm j’s idiosyncratic term meant to capture firm 
type, i.e. managerial ability, workplace organization, etc.  Worker type i is equal to 
either 1 or 2, low skill level and high skill level respectively.  A fraction ρ  of 
workers are type 2.   
In the second period, the realized returns for a worker i and firm j are 
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Workers and firms receive share B and 1-B of the match surplus.  In the first 
period, firms and workers know the distribution of worker and firm types.  Therefore, 
under rational expectations, workers’ and firms’ expectations of their second period 
earnings are the expected value of the ex-post earnings. 
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The random matching process that occurs in the second period translates into 
uncertainty in first period expected returns for both workers and firms.  Because 
workers don’t know either the type or the capital intensity of the firm with which they 
will match, their expected returns depend on the entire distribution of firm types.  
Similarly, because firms don’t know the skill level of the worker with whom they will 
match, their expected returns depend upon the distribution of worker types.  It is this 
uncertainty, coupled with the fact that firms must make their investment decision 
before meeting a worker, that is key to generating endogenous technology in the 
model.  Firms therefore make their investment decision in period one by equating the 
marginal expected return to capital investment to the marginal cost of capital. 
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This equation can be solved to find a closed form solution to the firm’s 
investment decision. 































Therefore, the model suggests two main factors that will affect a firm’s 
investment decision.  Aj  captures a firm’s ex-ante heterogeneity in the model.  The 
higher Aj is, the more likely a firm is to heavily invest in capital.  Empirically Aj 
represents factors such as managerial ability or corporate culture that are inherent, 
semi-fixed characteristics of the firm.   ρ  is the proportion of workers in the local 
labor market that is highly skilled.  Firms located in more skill intensive areas should, 
according to the model, invest more in capital.   
There are two key features of the model that lead to endogenous technology: 
capital-skill complementarity and search frictions.  Capital-skill complementarities in 
the production function imply that a more skilled worker raises the marginal benefit 
of investing in capital.  Therefore, if a firm knew with certainty the skill of the worker 
to which it would match in the second period, the optimal investment for the firm 
would increase with the skill of the worker.  However, due to search frictions, the 
firm does not know the type of worker with which it will match when it makes its 
investment decision in the first period.  Therefore, it bases its investment on the 
expectation of what that worker will be.  If there are a large number of highly skilled 
workers in the local labor market, i.e. a high ρ , the probability that the firm will 
match with a highly skilled worker increases, and therefore the firm invests more 
heavily.  If there were no search frictions, capital-skill complementarities would lead 
to a relationship between the skill level of the firm’s labor force and the firm’s 
technology choice.  However, under this alternate scenario, there would be no 




market after controlling for the firm’s skill mix.   Therefore, the empirical work can 
directly test if search frictions are generating endogenous technology. 
3.3 Data and Measurement Issues 
3.3.1 Workers 
All of the data used in this research are part of the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics program at the Census Bureau.  The data on workers is 
identical to that used in the previous chapter.  Information on workers comes from the 
Unemployment Insurance wage records for the selected three states.11  These files 
contain person identifiers that allow one to track a worker’s earnings within a state 
over the available period.12  The data also contain firm identifiers that allows for an 
exact link between the UI files and other data sets.  The UI wage records contain 
virtually all business employment for the states included in the analysis, creating a 
final sample size of 198,644,076 observations representing 37,875,250 people and 
3,989,740 firms.  The disadvantage of using the UI wage data to characterize workers 
is the limited demographic information available.  Within the Census bureau, this 
problem has been partially overcome by combining the UI wage data with other 
administrative data containing information on date of birth and gender.  Additionally, 
as will be discussed in more detail in the estimation section, the panel aspect of the 
data allows one to decompose wages into a worker effect, firm effect, explained 
component, and a residual. 
                                                 
11 Three states were chosen on the basis of time-series availability at the time of project inception from 
the larger set of available states.  A full list of the states available and additional information about the 
LEHD program is available at lehd.dsd.census.gov. 




The local labor market throughout this chapter will be defined as county of 
work for employees.  There is some limited county of residence information also 
available in the data.  However, this data is only available for 1999 and forward.  
Additionally, there are many reasons why the county of work is preferable.  The local 
labor market for this model is defined as the region around a firm from which it can 
draw potential workers.  Given that workers have varying preferences for place of 
work depending upon disutility of commuting and amenities of particular areas, the 
places where a worker may potentially be interested in working would best be defined 
by the current place of work rather than the place of residence.   
The county, rather than the metropolitan area is used to define the local labor 
market, largely because the measure of the local labor market is defined by where 
individuals work rather than where they live.  The metropolitan area definitions are 
created to capture a center of economic activity and the surrounding areas from which 
workers commute.  However, because this analysis is based on where individuals 
work, the metropolitan area definitions are less relevant here.  Also, as shown in the 
previous chapter, there is statistically significant variation in county skill within 
metropolitan areas.  Given that local labor market skill is the key independent 
variable, the greater variation will aid in identification of the effect of local labor 
market skill.  Despite the arguments given for using the county of work to define 
local labor market skill, as a robustness check, metropolitan area skill is also used as a 





Information on establishment investment comes from the 1992 Manufacturing 
Census.  In 1992, and Census years prior to 1992, the manufacturing Census included 
a series of detailed questions on capital expenditures for the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM) sample within the Census.  The ASM disproportionately 
samples large establishments and provides sample weights to make the data 
representative of all establishments in manufacturing.13  In addition to the sample 
weights, I also use the total value of shipments to weight the investment equation 
results in order to make the analysis representative of overall economic activity.  The 
key measure of investment used here focuses on expenditures on new computer 
equipment.  In order to create a measure of computer investment that is standardized 
across establishments of various sizes, two transformations of the computer 
investment data are used.  In the first measure, the computer investment data is 
divided by the number of employees at the establishment.  A second measure is 
created by dividing computer investment by total equipment expenditures to create a 
measure of the technology bias in an establishment’s investment decision.   
An additional measurement issue arises because the model has only very 
limited dynamics, and the data on computer investment is only available in a single 
cross section.  The estimation therefore implicitly assumes that computer investment 
is in a non-durable good.  There is some support for this assumption, although 
deciphering the expected lifecycle of computer equipment is a difficult task.  While 
                                                 
13 The ASM sample consists of a certainty and a sampled component.  The certainty component 
includes all establishments in companies with greater than $500 million in shipments in 1987, 
accounting for 18,000 establishments, and all establishments with greater than 250 employees, 
accounting for 10,000 establishments.  The remainder of the 27,000 ASM establishments is sampled 




computer equipment may not be a non-durable good, existing research shows that it 
has a short life span that seems to grow shorter as time passes.  Within the data, the 
main problem with modeling computers as a non-durable is the treatment of 
establishments with zero investment in the data.  While these establishments may be 
low technology firms, they may also be firms who invested heavily in the previous 
period.  The information available in the data makes it impossible to distinguish 
between these two groups, and approximately half of the firms included in the 
analysis have zero computer investment.  
The group of zero investors presents some potential problems for estimation.  
Two aspects of computer investment argue in favor of a large number of the zeroes 
being low-technology firms. The first is, as mentioned above, that the average life 
span of computer equipment is short.  If the life span of a computer is around a year, 
then there is no problem; the zeroes most likely represent low-tech firms.  The second 
aspect of computer investment that argues in favor of the zeroes being low-tech firms 
is the sharp increase in computer investment by manufacturing establishments 
between 1982 and 1992.  Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2000) have 
measured the mean level of computer investment per worker in manufacturing to be 
$40 in 1982, $140 in 1987 and $830 in 1992.  These numbers suggest that not many 
manufacturing firms had invested heavily in computer equipment in prior years.  
Additionally, the potential uses of computer equipment in manufacturing is increasing 
over the time period, so that it is likely that a even a firm that invested in previous 




In estimating the investment equation, the cross section of data is in essence a 
mismeasured version of the ideal computer investment measure.  As a robustness 
check to the base estimation, the zero investors are grouped with small investors.  
Grouping the firms in this fashion assumes that truly high-technology firms invest 
significantly in every time period, but that it is impossible to distinguish between non-
investors and small investors using the available cross-sectional data.  A probit is then 
used to determine to what extent county level skill predicts whether firms are high 
technology firms, and these results are compared with those from the estimation 
based more directly on the model above.   
Both the Census investment data and the LEHD data are at an establishment 
level, but the two datasets have different establishment identifiers.  The link between 
the data on investments and workers is available at an Employer Identification 
Number (EIN) level.14  The EIN is an administrative unit that for a multi-unit 
business may be broader than an establishment and as large as a firm.  For a single 
unit firm, the EIN is identical to the establishment.  Therefore, the firm level 
characteristics calculated using the UI data, such as the firm effect and firm level 
human capital, are at an EIN level so that they an be matched to the investment data.  
However, because an EIN can have establishments in multiple counties, the EIN is 
not an acceptable level of aggregation for the firm investment data given that a goal 
of the analysis is to test the connection between an establishment and the local labor 
market skill of the county in which it is located.  In order to handle this problem, the 
                                                 
14 While the EIN is the only common identifier between the two datasets, there are other variables in 
common between the datasets, such as SIC, employment and payroll that could be used as an 
additional restriction on the match.  Using additional restrictions, i.e. requiring that the EIN has the 




investment data is aggregated to an EIN-county level, so that the investment numbers 
reflect data from all the establishments for a given EIN within a given county.  This 
level of aggregation circumvents the problem of trying to match establishments in the 
UI data to establishments in the Census data when the common identifier is an EIN, a 
problem that affects about 5% of the observations.15  In addition, in the analysis here, 
the key variable is the skill level of the county, thereby making an establishment level 
match unnecessary.  Throughout the rest of this analysis, the EIN-county unit of 
aggregation will be referred to as the establishment. 
3.4 Estimation 
The model assumes that wages are determined via rent sharing.  This 
assumption in combination with the form of the production function laid out in the 
model implies that wages are a function of worker and firm characteristics.  Because 
worker and firm heterogeneity influence the local labor market skill mix and firm 
investment decisions respectively, it is necessary to characterize this heterogeneity 
before testing the main implications of endogenous technology laid out in the model.  
Population based estimates of worker and firm heterogeneity can be determined via a 
wage decomposition.  Taking advantage of what is available in the data, the equation 
used in estimation is 
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This decomposition of wages is a variation on the methodology developed by 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), that was also used in the previous chapter.  
                                                 
15 With computer investment as a percentage of equipment investment as the dependent variable, 95% 
of the observations are single establishment EIN-county level observations.  With computer investment 
per worker as the dependent variable, 96% of the observations are single establishment EIN-county 




Reiterating the key components of the equation, human capital is captured in the fixed 
worker effect, θ , and a quadratic in experience captured within X.  Firm 
characteristics are captured in the limited time varying firm effect,ψ .  The remaining 
variables contained in X are a series of gender by year by labor force attachment 
status dummies added to control for assumptions necessary to create an annualized 
wage measure from the quarterly earnings data.  These variables also control for the 
observable time-varying characteristics.   
The firm component of a worker's wages depends upon the firm's type and the 
type of technology being used at the firm.  Potentially, firm technology could vary 
period to period, thereby suggesting fully time-varying firm effects.  However, capital 
investment data is only available in two years, 1992 and 1997.16  Therefore, a 
measure of firm type is needed only in the periods prior to investment when the firm 
is making its investment decision.  The fixed firm effect is inappropriate because it 
will be contaminated with the current investment decision.  The limited time-varying 
firm-effect is a compromise between a fixed firm effect and a fully time varying firm 
effect.  While the fixed time effect is not compatible with the theoretical model laid 
out above, the fully time varying firm effect would be identified only off of the 
observations for a firm within a given year.  The limited time-varying firm effect 
contains the best attributes of either strategy, since it compatible with the theory and 
it is identified off of observations from multiple years.  The three sub-periods chosen 
are as follows: 1991 and earlier (the period before the first investment), 1992 through 
1996 (the period before the second investment), and 1997 on (the final period).   
                                                 
16 Investment data are generally only available during Census years.  In this chapter, the 1992 
computer investment data and the 1992 and 1997 equipment investment data are used.  Computer 




Identification in the limited time-varying firm effect model requires additional 
restrictions on the other covariates.  In particular, one time effect must be suppressed 
within each separate sub-period.  The time-varying firm effect is generated by 
creating three separate identifiers for each firm, corresponding to the three different 
time periods.  The three firm effects are identified separately by the observations for 
that firm within that time period only.  Although the firm effects are not generated in 
a manner which forces them to be correlated over time, analysis of the results from 
the wage equation show a correlation of approximately 0.7 between firm effects for 
the same firm across adjacent sub-periods.  These results suggest that a component of 
the firm effect is fixed, and, therefore, that the limited-time varying firm effect is an 
appropriate way to capture firm heterogeneity in the periods prior to investment. 
Due to the large sample sizes, the wage equation is estimated separately for 
each state using the conjugate gradient methodology as explained in Abowd, Creecy, 
and Margolis (2002).  The results are then pooled across the states included in the 
analysis, properly adjusting the person and firm effects to control for differences in 
state level mean wages.  Identification of the person and firm effects is then 
determined by applying a grouping algorithm to the pooled state data.  A connected 
group is determined by taking a firm, then pooling all of the employees of that firm, 
then taking all of the firms those employees ever worked at, then pooling all 
employees at the larger set of firms, and so on.  The connectedness of the data is 
generated by the mobility of workers across firms.  Within each connected group all 




analysis, 99.9% of the observations are in one connected group.17  In practice, the 
identification restriction is applied by setting the mean of the person and firm effects 
equal to zero for each connected group. 
The second equation to be estimated directly tests for endogenous technology 
at the establishment level.  Comparative statics of the model suggest that a firm’s 
technology decision should be increasing in firm type and, most importantly for 
endogenous technology, in the proportion of workers in the local labor market who 
are highly skilled.  Combining information available from the ASM along with 
worker and firm heterogeneity terms from the wage decomposition, endogenous 
technology can be directly tested using 
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Taking the components of the equation one by one,  is the technology 
investment variable; 
jtk
1−jtψ , the limited time-varying firm effect from the wage 
decomposition (9), is used as a proxy for firm type; and  is one of the measures of 
local labor market skill described below.  In the model,  is the stock of physical 
capital at the firm, and because the firm only exists for one time period, it is 
equivalent to investment in capital.  Empirically,  is measured as either computer 
investment per worker or computer investment as a fraction of machinery investment.  
Focusing on computer investment is ideal for two reasons.  The first is that capital 
skill complementarities are particularly strong with computers.  Additionally, 




                                                 




Computers are a type of investment that is relatively homogenous across industries, 
and therefore, computer investment is likely to capture similar interactions between 
firms and workers across the range of industries within manufacturing.  While the 
model laid out is not used to predict what the magnitude of 2φ should be, the model 
does clearly suggest that 2φ should be positive. 
As mentioned above, the estimated firm effect from the wage decomposition 
is used as a control for firm type in the investment equation.  While the model 
suggests that the firm effect would capture firm type, the firm effect is likely 
contaminated with other characteristics of the firm.  In particular, given the 
assumption that wages are determined via rent sharing, the firm effect is also 
capturing aspects of the firm’s technology.  Because lags of the firm’s technology are 
most likely correlated with their current technology investment decision, it is 
important to test the extent to which this misspecification might possibly bias the 
results.  This issue is empirically addressed by including a lag of the capital stock per 
employee, or capital intensity, as an additional control in the investment equation.  A 
more complete discussion and further justification for the empirical strategy can be 
found in Appendix A.  As is shown in the results section, this specification problem 
does not appear to affect greatly the coefficient on county skill. 
3.5 Characterizing Human Capital 
 Table 3.1 summarizes the results of estimating equation 9 with limited time 
varying firm effects.  These results are the same as table 2.1 in the previous chapter.  
Reviewing the key results, looking across the first row, the correlation of log wage 




results suggest that worker and firm effects are equally important in explaining the 
variation in log wages.  The covariance between the worker and firm effects at the 
individual level is positive, although small in magnitude at 0.07.  The positive 
covariance between worker and firm effects suggests that high skill workers are more 
likely to be at employed at high wage firms.  The results from estimating the wage 
equation are then used to quantify worker and firm heterogeneity.  For the worker, 
two measures of human capital are used.  The first measure uses only the worker 
effect, iθ , as was used in chapter 2.  The fixed worker effect in this model reflects 
any fixed characteristic of the worker that affects his wages.  Although no individual 
level comparison of the worker effect and more traditional measures of skill are done 
in this chapter, Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney (2003) have found that there is a 
positive correlation between the worker effect and education.  The second measure is 
constructed as follows 
  βθ itiit Xs
~+=  
where iθ  is the fixed worker effect, and X
~  is the subset of X that contains the 
quadratic in experience.  This second measure of human capital captures returns to 
experience in addition to the worker effect.   
Table 3.1: Results from Wage Regression 
 
Log wage Worker effect Firm effect XBeta Residual
Log wage 1 0.5643 0.4958 0.2294 0.4207
Worker effect 1 0.0655 -0.4740 0.0000
Firm effect 1 0.0355 0.0000
XBeta 1 0.0000





Throughout the rest of the chapter it is necessary to use functions of the 
individual level skill to define either firm or local labor market level skill measures.  
While the thetas estimated at the individual level are inconsistent, these functions of 
theta aggregated to the firm or county level are consistent.18  Two alternative 
measures of skill are used interchangeably throughout the chapter.  The first is a 
simple average of either of the human capital measures within the firm or local labor 
market, , where the subscript denotes the unit of observation and the superscript 
denotes the method of measurement.  The second measure, , calculates the 
percentage of workers within the firm or local labor market that are above a given 
threshold of the overall three-state distribution of the human capital measure for a 






th percentile, and therefore the measures represent the top quartile of worker 
human capital.19  These two measures capture different aspects of the skill 
distribution that are differentially valued by firms.  In a later section of the chapter, 
the skill measures created here are also compared with the percentage of college 
graduates by county. Among the advantages of using the LEHD data to develop a 
skill measure is that it is possible to identify the firm for which a worker works and, 
therefore, develop a firm-level skill measure. 
                                                 










θθ , obey the asymptotic distribution as where  
is the number of observations for firm j and 








σ under the assumption that the 
distribution of firm sizes is constant.  Under these same asympotitics,  will not converge to its true 
value. 
iθ
19 The 90th percentile was also used in earlier versions of this research and produced results similar to 




In order to identify the effect of local labor market skill in the investment 
equation, there must be variation across counties in skill.  Figures 2.1-2.4 in chapter 2 
depict county level skill over the time period in a series of kernel density estimates 
for two different measures of county level human capital.  Highlighting the key 
findings in chapter 2, the shape of the distribution in each of the years appears to be 
bi-modal with a large number of lower skill counties and a smaller concentration of 
high skill counties.  There also appears to be wide variation in the percentage of 
workers in each county who are in the top quartile of all workers with the least skilled 
county having 10% of these workers and the most skilled counties having over 30%.  
Figure 2.3 repeats the kernel density estimates measuring county skill as the mean 
theta for each county.  The distribution in figure 2.3 does not appear to be bi-modal 
but maintains a similar shape with a larger mass in the lower end of the distribution 
than in the high end.   
In order for firms to be able to predict the skill available in the local labor 
market, there must be persistence in county skill.  Additionally, if county skill is not 
persistent, then it seems more probable that firms are not limited to the type of 
workers currently in their local labor market.  Again, in chapter 2, Figures 2.10 and 
2.11 study short term and long term changes in county skill.  The clustering of 
counties around the 45-degree line is, not surprisingly, very tight at the county level.  
Over the one year time horizon, the overall increase in skill translates into a fitted 
regression line that is a small parallel shift of the 45-degree line, emphasizing the 
persistence in variation discovered in earlier figures.  Over the longer time horizon, 




degree line but also slightly less steep.  While workers may be mobile, their mobility 
patterns reinforce preexisting distributions of skill across counties, thereby suggesting 
that establishments are limited to the type of workers found in their local labor 
market. 
Finally, chapter 2 also outlined the similarities between these non-standard 
measures of skill and the percentage of workers with a college degree as calculated 
from the 1990 Census.  The correlation between the two measures is also high, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.73.  All three measures also have similar shapes to their 
density, with a large mass in the left tail of the density and a long right tail, although 
the pattern appears to be most pronounced in the college graduate measure.  While 
the percentage of college graduates in a county is a simple, attractive measure of 
county skill, it is not an ideal measure.  The percentage of college graduates is 
calculated from responses to the long form of the Census and, as with every other 
survey, the data is subject to varying response rates by county and respondent error.  
In addition, the quality of the college attended, the major chosen, and the success of 
the student in school are not captured in this measure.  The worker fixed effect, on the 
other hand, is a much richer measure of skill.  It captures any attribute of a worker 
that is fixed and that is valued in the labor market, potentially including aspects of 
worker skill missed by the college graduate measure.  While the exact components of 
what is encompassed in the worker fixed effect are unobservable, there are small 
differences between the different measures.  Therefore, the usage of the worker effect 
to measure skill should produce results similar to more traditional skill measures, 




robustness check, the percentage of college graduates by county is used as an 
alternative measure of local labor market skill. 
3.6 Computer Investment 
Before moving on to the regression results from the investment equations, a 
few more comments must be made on the computer investment variables.  Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 graph the cumulative distribution function for the two constructed computer 
investment measures, computer investment per worker and computer investment as a 
fraction of total machinery investment respectively.20  As is clear in both graphs, 
nearly half of the sample has zero computer investment.  In Figure 3.1, there is a 
sharp increase in the CDF right after zero, but the graph quickly flattens out and 
remains flat.  In Figure 3.2, there is also a sharp increase in the CDF immediately 
after zero followed by a much flatter increase.  Another sharp increase exists in the 
CDF exactly at 1, as a small portion of the establishments had all of their machinery 
investment in computers.   
                                                 
20 While computer investment/machinery investment is, by definition, bounded between zero and one, 
computer investment per worker has a very long right tail.  Therefore, in order to not disclose the 
maximum of the distribution, the cumulative density graphed here is truncated at $5,000 of computer 







































When considered within a time series perspective, 1992 was a year of strong 
growth in computer investment.  This growth in the use of computers around 1992 
also helps to argue in favor of the local skill level being exogenous to the firm.  While 
in equilibrium one would expect that an establishment would choose a location, and 
therefore local labor market skill, suitable for their technology, the development of a 
new technology such as computers is an exogenous shock.  The median age of a 
manufacturing establishment used in the analysis is 12 years. Most sample firms 
therefore made their initial location decisions on the technologies they expected to 
use over 10 years prior to 1992.  In 1982, computer investment per worker in 
manufacturing was less than 1/20th its 1992 level.21  In order to account for the large 
increase in computer investment, the set of technology options must have expanded 
over the time period, or the price of technology must have fallen to a level where 
more firms found it profitable to use computers.  Regardless, when these firms 
entered the market, they most likely were unable to predict the change in the 
technologies that would be available to them, suggesting that their location decision 
was exogenous to the investment decision being studied here.    
3.7 Results 
Before turning to the investment equation regressions, table 3.2 lists the 
summary statistics for the investment variables and results from the wage equation 
relevant to the investment analysis.  The final sample for the investment analysis is 
the result of a match between the Annual Survey of Manufacturing sample of the 
1992 Manufacturing Economic Census and the UI wage data for the selected three 
                                                 




states.  The level of aggregation for this sample is EIN-county.  Panel B gives an 
example of the effects of the sample restrictions and weighting on the key 
independent variable, mean county skill measured as the percentage of workers in a 
county who are in the overall top quartile of the theta distribution.  If one looks at the 
unweighted sample of counties, the mean county has approximately 20% of its 
workforce in the top quartile of the theta distribution with a variance of 0.05.  
Looking at the sample of firms that match to either of the computer investment 
variables, the mean county skill is much higher at 25%.  The mean county skill is 
higher in the matched sample because, as shown earlier, larger counties with more 
firms are more skilled.  Weighting county skill by the product of the ASM sample 
weight and the total value of shipments has little effect on either the mean or variance 




Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A:  





per worker ($1000) 









per worker ($1000, weighted) 



















/Machinery Inv. (weighted) 


































































1991 county skill, θl>75
(matched CI/MI sample) 








1991 county skill, θl>75
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Panel A of table 3.3 lists the results for the first set of regressions with 
computer investment per worker as the dependent variable.  There are six different 
specifications each including a different set of covariates.  The first is the most basic 
specification using only covariates that are implied by the theoretical model: county 
level skill and the firm effect as calculated from the wage equation.  The county skill 
measure used throughout the investment equation regressions omits the effect of the 
establishment’s own employees on local labor market skill.22  The second 
specification adds in firm level skill as a control, and the third includes both firm skill 
and the industry dummies.  Including firm level skill allows one to distinguish 
between the model outlined here and a competing model in which there are no search 
frictions.  In this alternate model, firms would be able to meet a worker and then 
invest in technology leading to a positive coefficient on firm skill and an insignificant 
coefficient on county skill.  Industry controls are necessary because industries locate 
non-randomly across geography.  If highly skilled counties were comprised of 
industries that are more likely to utilize computers, again the county skill coefficient 
would be biased upward.  Because the key independent variable varies by county but 
not by observation, robust standard errors based on clustering by county are included 
in parentheses. 
                                                 
22 The county skill measure excluding the establishment’s contribution is calculated by subtracting the 
measure of firm (ein) skill weighted by the number of workers at that establishment (ein-county) from 




Table 3.3: Results 
 
Panel A: Computer investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1991 county  8.515** 3.867** 3.719** 1.209* 1.266** 1.426** 
skill, θl>75 (3.510) (1.659) (1.837) (0.626) (0.620) (0.698) 
1991 estimated  0.422*** 0.701*** 0.734*** 0.460*** 0.518*** 0.427*** 
firm effect, ψ (0.158) (0.250) (0.240) (0.156) (0.162) (0.140) 
1991 firm skill,   4.756*** 4.443*** 2.926*** 3.064*** 3.004*** 
θj>75  (1.794) (1.658) (0.847) (0.912) (0.890) 
Capital stock       0.001 
per employee      (0.001) 
Constant -1.635** -1.522** -1.498** -0.558*** -0.602*** -0.677*** 
 (0.811) (0.622) (0.648) (0.197) (0.202) (0.245) 
Observations 8339 8339 8339 8339 7789 7789 
R-squared 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Ind. controls no no yes yes yes yes 
Cty interaction no no no yes yes yes 
Capital sample no no no no yes Yes 
% osd 62.86 28.55 27.46 8.93 9.34 10.53 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1991 county  0.682*** 0.343*** 0.099 0.236** 0.250*** 0.212** 
skill, θl>75 (0.084) (0.109) (0.114) (0.091) (0.093) (0.087) 
1991 estimated  -0.059*** -0.038** -0.018 -0.015 -0.010 0.012 
firm effect, ψ (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
1991 firm skill,   0.341*** 0.273*** 0.255*** 0.286*** 0.299*** 
θj>75  (0.056) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
Capital stock       -0.000*** 
per employee      (0.000) 
Constant -0.033* -0.025 -0.012 -0.040 -0.051** -0.033 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Observations 6833 6833 6833 6833 6399 6399 
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 
Ind. controls no no yes yes yes yes 
Cty interaction no no no yes yes yes 
Capital sample no no no no yes Yes 
% osd 29.16 14.68 4.25 10.07 10.69 9.06 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Weighted by ASM sample 
weight and total value of shipments. County skill measure excludes establishment’s contribution.  % 
osd is the predicted percent change in the dependent variable due to a one standard deviation increase 
in county skill. 





The key coefficient of interest, the percentage of workers in a county who are 
in the top quartile adjusted for the establishment’s contribution, is listed first.  This 
coefficient is positive and significant in each of the first three specifications.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient on county skill diminishes as the additional control 
variables are added to the specification.  In order to put an interpretation on the 
coefficient, the predicted percentage change in the dependent variable due to a one 
standard deviation increase in county skill is reported in the last row.  In the third 
specification, the regression implies that a one standard deviation increase in county 
skill leads to a 27% increase in the amount of computer investment per worker.  The 
other two independent variables in the first three specifications are the firm effect 
from the wage regression and firm level skill.  The coefficient on the estimated firm 
effect is positive and significant once industry controls are included, and the 
coefficient on firm skill is positive and significant in all of the specifications.  Both 
variables have coefficients smaller in magnitude than county skill.   
The specification in column 4 examines the effect of the most highly skilled 
county on the results.  The existence of concentrations of establishments in like 
industries is well known.  While the driving force behind these agglomeration 
economies may very well be their access to a pool of highly skilled labor and, 
consistent with the theory laid out above, the success of these agglomeration 
economies may also be due to a myriad of factors not captured in the model.  In order 
to determine if the results here are driven by a few agglomeration economies existing 
in highly skilled local labor markets, an interaction term between each of the key 




was included in the fourth regression.  While the coefficient on county skill is still 
positive and significant, the magnitude of the coefficient drops, suggesting that the 
predicted increase in computer investment per worker from a one standard deviation 
increase in county skill is around 9%.  Throughout most of the rest of the results, the 
interaction with the most highly skilled county is included in order to present a more 
conservative estimate of the effect of county skill.  Whether or not the forces outlined 
in the model drive the effect of this most highly skilled county on the results, the 
inclusion of these interaction terms is necessary because the relationship between 
county skill and establishment investment in computers is non-linear due to this one 
county.  The sensitivity of the results to such nonlinearities is further explored in the 
next section. 
Columns 5 and 6 address a specification issue related to the estimated firm 
effect.  While the model suggests that technology investment is influenced by firm 
type, a pure measure of firm type is not available.  What is available is the estimated 
firm effect from the wage decomposition, which captures characteristics of a firm 
captured in their employee’s wages.  Under the assumption that wages are determined 
via rent-sharing, this firm effect should be a good proxy for firm type, but will be 
contaminated with other characteristics of the firm.  In particular, if the estimated 
firm effect captures characteristics of the firm’s previous technology decisions, and if 
these previous technology decisions are correlated with current technology 
investment, then the coefficient on the firm effect will be biased.  The coefficient on 
county skill, the key variable for testing endogenous technology, will also be biased 




orthogonal to the firm effect, then the bias due to this specification problem will only 
affect the coefficient on the firm effect.  In order to determine whether omission of 
previous technology investment affects the results, the 1991 capital stock is included 
as an additional covariate.   
The capital stock measure is only available for a subset of the firms used in 
the earlier analysis.  Column 5 repeats the specification in column 4 on this subset of 
firms.  Column 6 includes the capital stock measure as an additional control variable.  
In the fifth column, the coefficient on county skill is slightly higher for the subset of 
firms for which capital stock information is available.  Including the capital stock 
measure in column 6 increases the coefficient on county skill further.  This suggests 
that any potential bias from using the proxy for firm type and not controlling for the 
capital stock will depress the coefficient on county skill.  Given that the capital stock 
variable is only available for a subsample of the data, the results in the following 
tables rely on the full sample and provide a conservative estimate of the effect of 
county skill on technology investment.  While the coefficient on county skill 
increases with the inclusion of lagged capital stock, the coefficient on the firm effect 
decreases, as would be expected.   
Panel B of table 3.3 repeats the specifications in panel A replacing the 
dependent variable with the bias of investment toward computers.  The pattern in the 
results is very similar.  The coefficient on county skill excluding the establishment’s 
contribution falls as controls for firm level skill and industry are included.  However, 
while the coefficient on county skill is positive in all of the specifications, it is only 




level skill and industry dummies are included simultaneously in column 3.  When the 
key coefficients in the model are interacted with the most highly skilled county, in 
column 4, the effect is also different with computer bias as the dependent variable.  
Here the nonlinearities appear to be depressing the size of the coefficient on county 
skill.  Once the interaction terms are included the size of the coefficient increases 
dramatically and is once again significant.  In this specification, a one standard 
deviation increase in county skill is predicted to increase the bias in investment 
toward computers at the establishment level by 10%.  The other independent 
variables in the first three specifications are the firm effect and firm level skill.  The 
coefficient on the firm effect is negative and significant in all of the specifications, 
which goes against the model predictions, but small in magnitude.  The coefficient on 
firm level skill is positive, significant, and of a greater magnitude than the coefficient 
on county skill. 
Restricting the sample to that for which the capital stock measure is available, 
in column 5, increases the coefficient on county skill by a small amount, as was the 
case in panel A.  Adding the capital stock as a covariate, however, decreases the 
magnitude of this coefficient by a small amount, suggesting that omitting previous 
capital investment inflates previous results.  This is contrary to the results in the first 
panel.  However, because the change in the coefficient is small, the specification 
without a control for the capital stock is still preferred and used throughout the 
remaining tables.  Appropriate caution is necessary when assessing the magnitude of 





The two different dependent variables used to test the model, computer 
investment per worker and the percentage of investment that is in computers, largely 
lead to the same conclusions as to the effect of county skill on establishment 
investment.  Both dependent variables predict large effects for county skill, which 
diminish as additional controls are added.  The biggest difference between the two 
specifications is the sensitivity of the results to the most highly skilled county.  While 
including additional interaction terms decreases the explanatory power of county skill 
in the first set of regressions, it increases the effect of county skill in the second set of 
regressions.  Much of the difference is likely due to the fact that the computer 
investment bias measure is bounded between zero and one.  Regardless of its 
location, a firm can, at most, concentrate 100% of its investment in computers.  
Computer investment per worker, on the other hand, is unbounded.   
Due to the sensitivity of the results to one county, the preferred base 
specification is the fourth column of the table, which includes interaction terms with 
the most highly skilled county.  These results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in county skill will lead to an 9% increase in computer investment per 
worker or a 10% increase in the share of investment in computers.  While these 
effects might seem large, a one standard deviation increase in county skill is 
equivalent to a five-percentage point increase in the number of workers in a county 
who are in the top quartile of the overall skill distribution.  A five percentage point 
increase in skill, in which the average county has 25% of its workers in the top 
quartile, would require a significant reallocation of workers.  Still, interpreting the 




establishment’s investment decision.  Regardless of the dependent variable being 
studied, the effect of a firm’s own skill mix, industry, and firm type are also important 
factors in an establishment’s investment decision. 
3.8 Robustness Checks 
Because a variety of measurement and specification decisions underlie the 
results in table 3.3, a series of robustness checks are included below to test the 
sensitivity of the results to these assumptions.  As is shown in detail below, the results 
in table 3.3 are robust to most of these decisions.  In instances in which the results are 
sensitive, potential explanations are provided. 
3.8.1 Nonlinearities 
Given that the most highly skilled county greatly influences the coefficient on 
county skill, table 3.4 tests further for nonlinearities in county skill and offers a 
possible explanation.  Column 1 repeats the base specification but includes no 
interactions with highly skilled counties.  Column 2 is identical to the fourth column 
in the previous table and includes an interaction between the key independent 
variables in the model and the most highly skilled county.  The third column includes 
interactions with the top 5% of most skilled counties which includes 9 counties.   As 
shown earlier, the inclusion of interactions greatly affects the coefficient on county 
skill in both panel A and panel B, moving the coefficient in opposing directions in the 
two panels.  Concentrating next on column three, one finds that the coefficient on 
county skill does not change much when the regression includes an interaction with 




with highly skilled counties is concentrated in just one county that happens to be the 
most skilled one.   
Table 3.4: Robustness: Nonlinearities 
 
Panel A: Computer Investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 3.719** 1.209* 1.623** 2.508** 
 (1.837) (0.626) (0.626) (1.134) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ  0.734*** 0.460*** 0.450*** 0.693*** 
 (0.240) (0.156) (0.170) (0.204) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 4.443*** 2.926*** 2.841*** 4.376*** 
 (1.658) (0.847) (0.923) (1.582) 
% workers in high skill ind.    4.488*** 
    (1.336) 
Constant -1.498** -0.558*** -0.637*** -1.353*** 
 (0.648) (0.197) (0.223) (0.370) 
Observations 8339 8339 8339 8339 
R-squared 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.22 
County interactions none top 1 top 5% none 
% osd 27.46 8.93 11.98 18.52 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.099 0.236** 0.247*** 0.168** 
 (0.114) (0.091) (0.093) (0.078) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 0.273*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.276*** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.041) 
% workers in high skill ind.    -0.248*** 
    (0.058) 
Constant -0.012 -0.040 -0.042* -0.020 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) 
Observations 6833 6833 6833 6833 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Cty interactions none top 1 top 5% none 
% osd 4.25 10.07 10.54 7.16 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Weighted by ASM sample 
weight and total value of shipments.  Two digit industry dummies included.  County skill measure 
excludes establishment’s contribution.  % osd is the predicted percent change in the dependent variable 
due to a one standard deviation increase in county skill.  





The most highly skilled county is not an outlier in its skill level, which is not 
far removed from the rest of the distribution.  Rather, this one county has both many 
skilled workers and high levels of computer investment.  The final regression in table 
3 highlights one potential characteristic of the highly skilled county that may be 
driving its impact on the results.  In the fourth specification, the county’s percentage 
of workers employed in high tech industries, SIC 35 and 36,23 is included as a 
covariate.  These results are similar to the prior regression that included the 
interaction terms with the most highly skilled county.  As mentioned above, the 
impact of this one county may be due to aspects of agglomeration economies that are 
not captured in the endogenous technology model.    
3.8.2 Weighting/Firm Size 
The dependent variables used throughout the analysis so far all require use of 
the ASM to obtain information on expenditures on computers.  This sample drawn 
from the Census of Manufactures is disproportionately composed of large firms and is 
not representative of all manufacturing establishments.24  In order to make the results 
representative of the average manufacturing establishment the results must be 
weighted by the Census ASM sample weight.  However, the representative firm in 
manufacturing is rather small and therefore accounts for only a small fraction of the 
manufacturing industry’s output.  Due to this fact, all of the regressions in the earlier 
tables are weighted by the product of the Census ASM sample weight and the total 
                                                 
23 SIC 35 and 36 are Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment; and Electronic 
and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, respectively. 




value of shipments for that establishment in order to make the results representative 
of a given unit of economic activity.   
Table 3.5 repeats the base specification using three different weighting 
patterns to highlight the effect of weighting on the results.  In the first column no 
weights are used, in the second column the Census ASM weight is used, and in the 
third column the product of the Census ASM weight and the total value of shipments 
is used, as in the rest of the analysis.  The effect of weighting on the county skill 
coefficient is similar for either dependent variable although stronger when looking at 
computer investment per worker.  In the unweighted regression the predicted effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in county skill on the dependent variable leads to a 
2% increase in computer investment per worker.  Weighting the same regression by 
the Census ASM weight makes the effect negative, and weighting by the product of 
the Census ASM weight and total value of shipments increases the effect to 9%.  
With computer investment per worker, the same effect is 6% with no weighting, 0.5% 
with Census ASM weighting, and 10% with Census ASM and total value of 




Table 3.5: Robustness: Weighting/Firm Size 
 
Panel A: Computer Investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.313 -0.590 1.209* 
 (0.340) (0.355) (0.626) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ 0.174*** 0.116*** 0.460*** 
 (0.055) (0.042) (0.156) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 0.991*** 0.548*** 2.926*** 
 (0.156) (0.090) (0.847) 
Constant -0.095 0.155* -0.558*** 
 (0.080) (0.089) (0.197) 
Observations 8339 8339 8339 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.30 
Weight none Census Census*TVS 
% osd 2.31 -4.35 8.93 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.151** 0.010 0.236** 
 (0.066) (0.211) (0.091) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ 0.016 0.059** -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 0.088*** 0.115** 0.255*** 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.042) 
Constant -0.005 0.042 -0.040 
 (0.017) (0.056) (0.024) 
Observations 6833 6833 6833 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.16 
Weight none Census Census*TVS 
% osd 6.44  0.45 10.07 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Two digit industry dummies and 
interaction terms with high skill county included.  County skill measure excludes establishment’s 
contribution.  % osd is the predicted percent change in the dependent variable due to a one standard 
deviation increase in county skill.  





The differences in the effect of county skill on investment across the 
regressions is most likely due to the differences in the explanatory power of different 
size firms.  The unweighted sample is disproportionately composed of large firms, 
and the Census ASM weight corrects for that so that the results reflect the 
representative firm, which is much smaller.  Finally, the product of the Census ASM 
weight and the total value of shipments shifts the emphasis back to larger firms again.  
Why does the effect of county skill seem to be larger for larger firms?  This effect 
may be driven by a variety of reasons.  First, computer investment at the 
establishment level is measured with less error in larger firms.  The ASM is collected 
in order to publish aggregate statistics about manufacturing.  Because larger firms 
will drive any aggregate statistic, more effort is focused on collecting data in these 
large firms.  Second, there may be non-linearities in the relationship between county 
skill and establishment investment in computers.  In part, this effect is driven by the 
fact that larger firms need to hire more workers.  Earlier research has shown that in 
order to get the greatest productivity boost from introducing computers, 
establishments must integrate computers into much of their operations.  Larger 
establishments with larger operations require more skilled workers in order to 
integrate computers.  In addition, larger establishments invest more per worker than 
small establishments even when controlling for industry, the firm effect from the 
wage equation, and firm level skill.   
3.8.3 Alternate Skill Measures 
Table 3.6 tests the sensitivity of the results to different ways of measuring 




percentage of workers in a county from the top quartile of the theta distribution by 
measuring human capital using the sum of the fixed worker effect and the predicted 
effect of experience from the wage regression.  For either dependent variable, the 
effect of county skill is a bit larger when worker experience is included in the skill 
measure.  The third column uses the mean theta in a county and the fourth column 
uses the mean of the sum of theta and experience.  The results from both of these 
specifications closely follow the pattern found for the top quartile measures when 
looking at computer investment per worker.  With investment bias towards computers 
as the dependent variable, the effect of mean county skill is smaller when worker 




Table 3.6: Robustness: Alternative Skill Measures 
 
Panel A: Computer Investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 1.209*     
 (0.626)     
1991 county skill, sl>75  2.161**    
  (0.832)    
1991 county skill, θlmn   0.534   
   (0.347)   
1991 county skill, slmn    1.219***  
    (0.406)  
% College Grad     1.841*** 
     (0.527) 
Observations 8339 8339 8339 8339 8339 
R-squared 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.17 
% osd 8.93 13.81 9.46 15.03 17.90 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.236**     
 (0.091)     
1991 county skill, sl>75  0.352***    
  (0.118)    
1991 county skill, θlmn    0.129***   
   (0.036)   
1991 county skill, slmn     0.093*  
    (0.050)  
% College Grad     0.243*** 
     (0.062) 
Observations 6833 6833 6833 6833 6833 
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 
% osd 10.07 13.05 13.21 6.65 13.67 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Two digit industry dummies, a 
constant term, and interactions with high skill county are included all the specifications.  Firm level 
skill is included in the first four specifications.  Weighted by ASM sample weight and total value of 
shipments.  % college graduates in county calculated from 1990 Census data.  County skill measure 
excludes establishment’s contribution in columns 1-4.  % osd is the predicted percent change in the 
dependent variable due to a one standard deviation increase in county skill. 





Finally the fifth column uses the percentage of college graduates in a county 
calculated using the 1990 Census data.  For either dependent variable, these results 
are remarkably close to that found in the base specification.  While the impact of 
county skill is a bit larger, this specification does not include a control for firm level 
skill because it is not possible to compute using Census data.  Additionally, because 
there is no information on firm skill, the firm’s contribution to the county skill 
measure cannot be excluded as it is in the other columns.  The key difference between 
the college measure and the others is that the college measure is calculated using 
individual’s responses about their education from the Census, while the other skill 
measures are derived from a wage regression using administrative data.  Additionally, 
this measure of county skill uses 1990 data while the other county skill measures all 
use 1991 data.  While the differences between the results using the employer-
employee matched data from LEHD and those using the Decennial Census data may 
be small, the matched data is necessary for two primary reasons.  The first is that the 
magnitude of the results are deceptively large when using the Decennial Census 
measure because one cannot control for firm level skill.  The second reason is that the  
firm effect can be computed only from the matched data, and is a control in the 
investment equation mandated by the model.  
The small differences in the predicted change in the dependent variable due to 
a one standard deviation increase in the county skill measure across the five 
specifications suggests that the effect being found is not the result of a particular way 
of measuring skill.  The results in the final column are the strongest support for this 




3.8.4 Alternate Local Labor Market Measure 
County of work has been used as the measure of the local labor market 
throughout the analysis.  While a county is a desirable measure of the local labor 
market for the reasons listed above, the metropolitan area is also commonly used to 
define a local labor market.  Table 3.7 includes a comparison between the base 
specification, in column 1, and one in which the local labor market is defined by the 
metropolitan area25 in column 2.  Because the metropolitan areas are not exhaustive, 
the counties outside of any metropolitan area are included in one pooled non-metro 
area group in column 2.  Columns 3 and 4 exclude establishments in these non-metro 
areas.  Using either dependent variable and whether or not the non-metro areas are 
included, the results are largely the same across all of the specifications.  With 
computer investment per worker, the results are a bit stronger when using the 
metropolitan areas, especially when the non-metro areas are dropped from the 
analysis.  In panel B, the results with computer investment over machinery 
investment are a bit smaller when the metropolitan areas are used, whether or not the 
non-metro areas are excluded from the analysis.  The effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in local labor market skill is a bit misleading because there is less 
variance in metropolitan area skill than there is in county skill.  Regardless, using the 
metropolitan area as the measure of the local labor market produces results very 
similar to those produced using county as the local labor market measure. 
                                                 
25 The metropolitan area used in this analysis is either the Metropolitan Statistical Area or the Primary 
Metropolitan Statistical Area of a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area.  For the states included 




Table 3.7: Robustness: Alternative Local Labor Market Measure 
 
Panel A: Computer Investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 1.209*  1.770**  
 (0.626)  (0.819)  
1991 msa skill, θm>75  1.677***  2.482*** 
  (0.569)  (0.759) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ  0.460*** 0.457*** 0.497*** 0.498*** 
 (0.156) (0.158) (0.156) (0.162) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 2.926*** 2.908*** 2.926*** 2.914*** 
 (0.847) (0.837) (0.872) (0.865) 
Constant -0.558*** -0.663*** -0.712*** -0.880*** 
 (0.197) (0.219) (0.248) (0.278) 
Observations 8339 8339 7757 7757 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Non-metro areas included  yes  yes no no 
% osd 8.93 9.85 13.06 14.59 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.236**  0.240**  
 (0.091)  (0.114)  
1991 msa skill, θm>75  0.224**  0.212* 
  (0.091)  (0.114) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) 
Constant -0.040 -0.038 -0.039 -0.033 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) 
Observations 6833 6833 6324 6324 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Non-metro areas included yes  yes no no 
% osd 10.07 7.62 10.28 7.21 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Weighted by ASM sample 
weight and total value of shipments.  Two digit industry dummies and interaction terms with high skill 
county included.  County and MSA skill measure excludes establishment’s contribution.  % osd is the 
predicted percent change in the dependent variable due to a one standard deviation increase in county 
skill. 






As mentioned above, the computer investment data used for this analysis 
comes from a single cross section.  Implicitly, the estimation assumes that computers 
are a non-durable.  As a robustness check to the base specification, establishments are 
placed into a low investor and a high investor group, where the high investors are in 
the top quartile of either computer investment per worker or computer investment as a 
share of machinery investment.  Table 3.8 repeats the base specification, excluding 
firm skill in column one and with firm skill in column two, and shows the results of 
the probit without firm skill in column three and with firm skill in column four.  The 
probit predicts that a one standard deviation increase in county skill will increase the 
likelihood that a firm is high tech, as measured using computer investment per 
worker, by 2 to 9% depending on whether or not firm skill is included.  While the 
results in columns one and two appear larger, the specifications are measuring 
different things and are impossible to directly compare.  However, they do both 
suggest that county skill plays a role in computer investment.  In Panel B, the base 
specification predicts between a 10 and 17% increase in computer investment over 
machinery investment from a one standard deviation increase in county skill, while 





Table 3.8: Robustness: Probit 
 
Panel A: Computer Investment per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ols ols probit probit 
1991 county skill, θl>75 2.907*** 1.209* 0.783* 0.192 
 (0.823) (0.626) (0.447) (0.442) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ 0.367*** 0.460*** 0.326*** 0.384*** 
 (0.140) (0.156) (0.058) (0.055) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75  2.926***  0.943*** 
  (0.847)  (0.173) 
Constant -0.464** -0.558***   
 (0.191) (0.197)   
Observations 8339 8339 8338 8338 
R-squared 0.16 0.30   
% osd 21.46 8.93 9.43 2.31 
 
Panel B: Computer Investment/Machinery Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ols ols probit probit 
1991 county skill, θl>75 0.403*** 0.236** 1.744*** 1.325*** 
 (0.096) (0.091) (0.464) (0.439) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ -0.028** -0.015 -0.003 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.065) (0.061) 
1991 firm skill, θj>75  0.255***  0.650*** 
  (0.042)  (0.122) 
Constant -0.032 -0.040   
 (0.025) (0.024)   
Observations 6833 6833 6832 6832 
R-squared 0.13 0.16   
% osd 17.25 10.07 24.37 18.58 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Weighted by ASM sample 
weight and total value of shipments.  Two digit industry dummies and interaction terms with high skill 
county included.  County skill measure excludes establishment’s contribution.  % osd is the predicted 
percent change in the dependent variable due to a one standard deviation increase in county skill. 






3.8.6 Alternate Dependent Variables 
As a final robustness check, machinery investment per worker, a separate 
question on the ASM from computer investment, is used as the dependent variable in 
table 3.9.  Machinery investment per worker is asked of all establishments in Census 
years, therefore the results using machinery investment per worker are computed for 
both years for which human capital data is also available, 1992 and 1997.  Because 
machinery investment data is collected for all establishments, the Census ASM 
sample weight does not apply here, and results are weighted only by the total value of 
shipments for that establishment.  The results in Panel A, machinery investment per 
worker in 1992, and in Panel B, machinery investment per worker in 1997, both 
follow the same broad pattern.  The first specification uses theta as the measure of 
county skill.  The second also uses theta and additionally includes interactions 
between the key coefficients and the most skilled county.  The third uses the sum of 
theta and worker experience to measure county skill and the fourth adds in 
interactions with the most skilled county.  Contrary to the earlier results using 
computer investment as the dependent variable, the coefficient on county skill is 
negative in the first two specifications of either panel, suggesting that firms in 
counties with large numbers of workers with high worker effects are less likely to 
invest in machinery.  However, the coefficient is positive, yet still not significant, in 
the last two specifications, in which county skill is measured using the sum of the 
worker effect and worker experience. The difference in the pattern in these results 
compared to the earlier results using computer investment is likely due to the fact that 




computer investment, it is also comprised of much older technologies.  These older 
technologies may disproportionately require worker experience.  While the 
endogenous technology model does not fit as well using machinery investment per 
worker as the dependent variable, table 8 provides some evidence that the results laid 





Table 3.9: Robustness: Machinery Investment per Worker 
 
Panel A: Machinery Investment per Worker, 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 estimated firm effect, ψ 11.099*** 11.422*** 9.934*** 10.546*** 
 (2.881) (3.151) (2.811) (3.004) 
1991 county skill, θl>75 -4.284 -6.152   
 (23.345) (31.787)   
1991 firm skill, θj>75 16.583*** 15.520**   
 (5.097) (5.997)   
1991 county skill, sl>75   24.047 29.898 
   (24.973) (45.600) 
1991 firm skill, sj>75   4.645 4.646 
   (5.230) (6.072) 
Constant 3.531 4.017 -0.514 -2.028 
 (5.830) (8.156) (5.998) (10.846) 
Observations 56563 56563 56563 56563 
R-squared 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 
County interactions none top 1 none top 1 
% osd -1.88 -2.69 9.12 11.34 
 
Panel B: Machinery Investment per Worker, 1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1996 estimated firm effect, ψ 21.307*** 21.126*** 19.825*** 19.557*** 
 (3.454) (3.572) (3.853) (4.009) 
1996 county skill, θl>75 -12.988 -16.042   
 (12.822) (12.271)   
1996 firm skill, θj>75 19.713*** 24.481***   
 (4.888) (5.441)   
1996 county skill, sl>75   5.639 6.484 
   (14.509) (18.056) 
1996 firm skill, sj>75   14.814*** 16.597*** 
   (3.118) (3.518) 
Constant 10.450*** 10.179** 5.779 5.052 
 (3.810) (4.165) (4.259) (5.375) 
Observations 55604 55604 55604 55604 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
County interactions none top 1 none top 1 
% osd -4.13 -5.11 1.55 1.79 
 
Robust standard errors based on clustering by county in parentheses.  Weighted by total value of 
shipments.  Two digit industry dummies and interaction terms with high skill county included.  County 
skill measure excludes establishment’s contribution.  % osd is the predicted percent change in the 
dependent variable due to a one standard deviation increase in county skill.   






There is tremendous heterogeneity in the technology employed by firms, even 
in well-defined industries.  One potential cause of this heterogeneity is endogenous 
technology driven by the variation and persistence of human capital across different 
local labor markets.  The research here builds a matching model capturing the effects 
of local labor market worker skill on establishment investment decisions.  By taking 
advantage of a unique employer-employee matched dataset, the results begin to 
quantify the effects of local labor market skill on establishment technology. 
The best estimates of the effect of county skill on an establishment’s 
investment predicts that a one standard deviation increase in county skill will lead to 
an 9% increase in computer investment per worker and an 10% increase in the 
investment share of computers for a representative unit of economic activity.  
Weighting the results and thereby shifting the emphasis between smaller and larger 
firms does affect the results.  The effect of an increase in county skill is not nearly as 
large for a representative establishment.  This outcome suggests that county skill has 
a greater impact on the investment decisions of larger firms.  However, the results are 
robust to different ways of measuring county skill, different measures of the local 
labor market, and different functional forms of the specification.  The results are 
sensitive to the type of investment undertaken by the establishment.  When county 
level skill is measured by including the effect of worker experience, one finds 
positive yet insignificant results with machinery investment per worker as the 
dependent variable, likely due to the fact that capital-skill complementarity is not as 




other research on technology adoption.  Productivity enhancements from the usage of 
computers require widespread changes in an establishment.  These changes require a 
large investment in skilled workers.  The research here suggests that firms are more 
willing to make the investment in computers if the necessary workforce is available. 
One area for further research is to explore how endogenous technology affects 
the dynamics of worker location.  While the empirical work here uses investment in 
computers in a relatively early time period to ensure that workers are exogenously 
distributed in reference to firms’ likelihood of investing in computers, data in later 
periods can be used to examine workers’ reactions to firms’ investments.  The results 
here suggest that it is in the best interest of the high-tech firm and the highly skilled 
worker to locate in high skill areas.  As the usage of technology increases in an area, 




Chapter 4: Estimating External Returns to Education 
 
Public funding of education has largely been motivated by the belief that there 
are positive externalities associated with education.  Different policy makers have 
cited a variety of positive externalities associated with education, including a more 
informed voting citizenry and more productive workforce.  Economists have focused 
mostly on the effect that raising the education level of all workers has on individual 
worker wages.  The focus on wages is due in part to the fact that information on 
wages is readily available, but also because wages are one of the best measures 
available for capturing the productivity of individual workers.   While there is a 
strong empirical relationship between the level of education and level of wages in a 
local labor market, identifying the causal relationship of the effect of education on 
wages is much more difficult.  Workers may be paid higher wages in highly educated 
areas because the overall level of education raises their productivity, or workers in 
highly educated areas may also be paid more because they are a selected group of 
workers.  Workers are very mobile and are likely to select into the location that 
rewards their skills the best.  Workers in high education areas are by definition more 
educated, but they might also vary in non-random ways on other unobservable 
dimensions.  Additionally, both the observable and unobservable characteristics of 
workers may receive different returns in differently skilled areas.  The econometric 
strategy employed here directly addresses the potential nonrandom selection by 
allowing for variation in the returns to both observable and unobservable 




While other research into the external returns to education have allowed the 
returns to observable characteristics to vary across differently skilled local labor 
markets and used a fixed worker effect to control for unobservable individual skill, 
specifications using this estimation strategy do not allow the returns to unobservable 
skills to be different in high and low skill local labor markets.  Given that others have 
found that the returns to education vary in high and low skill areas, it is likely that the 
returns to unobservables also vary.  This possibility is likely to bias results toward 
finding an effect of higher metro area education on individual wages for two reasons.  
The first is that more highly educated workers are likely to also be higher ability 
workers, and therefore, areas with high levels of education are also likely to have 
strong concentrations of high ability workers.  Additionally, given that highly 
educated areas compensate education more generously, it is likely that they also 
compensate ability more generously.  Therefore, the finding that workers in high skill 
metropolitan areas have higher wages may be due to the fact that these workers are 
more skilled among unobservable dimensions and are also rewarded more generously 
for these skills. 
This chapter decomposes the wage gap between workers in low and high skill 
metropolitan areas in a series of different specifications.  The first specification 
estimates the raw wage gap between workers in high and low skill areas.  The second 
adds observable characteristics of workers and their firms.  In the third specification, 
the returns to observable skill are allowed to vary between high and low skill 
metropolitan areas.  Next, fixed worker effects are included to control for unobserved 




chapter, allows for different returns to these unobservable characteristics in high and 
low skill areas. 
The econometric strategy here focuses on directly estimating separate returns 
to observable and unobservable skill in metropolitan areas with different levels of 
skilled workers.  The permanent component of the error term is interacted with an 
indicator for high skill metropolitan area to allow for different returns to unobservable 
skill.  A quasi-differenced wage equation is then estimated via non-linear 
instrumental variables as described in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2002).  
This estimation strategy decomposes the wage gap between high and low skill 
metropolitan areas into different returns to observable skills, different returns to 
unobservable skills, and a part that is not attributable to the characteristics of the 
worker.  This final piece of the wage decomposition most closely aligns with the 
earlier estimates of the effect of metro area’s skill on worker wages. 
Results from this last specification suggest that both the observable and 
unobservable characteristics of workers may receive higher returns in more highly 
skilled metropolitan areas.  After controlling for these characteristics, the coefficient 
on the indicator for a highly skilled metropolitan area is no longer significant.  These 
results are not necessarily a refutation of models in which workers in more highly 
skilled areas are more productive.  Rather, the results here suggest that the impact of a 
concentration of skilled workers may be felt more strongly for the most skilled 
workers.  The next section discusses the existing literature on measuring the external 




following sections then outline the estimation strategy, the data used, and finally the 
results. 
4.1 Measuring the Social Return to Higher Education 
Rauch (1993) is one of the earlier papers that attempts to directly estimate the 
social return to high levels of human capital by using variation in skill across 
metropolitan areas in the United States.  He motivates his research using a variant of a 
modeled originally developed by Roback (1982).  In the model, the consumer iso-
utility curve and the firm iso-cost curve determine the equilibrium level of wages and 
rents within each city.  Consumers prefer higher wages and lower rents, while firms 
prefer lower wages and lower rents.  Workers and firms therefore sort themselves 
across cities so that they receive the same utility/face the same total costs in each city.  
Within this model, the level of education of a metropolitan area is considered a site 
characteristic that potentially increases the productivity of workers.  The spatial 
equilibrium is maintained, however, through variation in rents across local areas.  
Rauch then uses a reduced form version of the model to empirically test if the level of 
education has an effect on either the wages or rents in an area.  As predicted from the 
model, metropolitan areas with higher levels of education have higher wages and 
higher rents.  Rauch then provides further evidence that his results are not due to 
other omitted characteristics of metropolitan areas or higher unobserved ability of 
workers.  He addresses the self-selection issue by testing the additional implications 
of higher returns to unobserved ability and therefore selection of high ability workers 




workers into high skill areas is important, then according to the Roy model, there 
should also be higher wage dispersion, for which he finds no empirical evidence. 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) extend this earlier literature by focusing on the 
identification of the causal effect of aggregate levels of education on an individual’s 
earnings.  They identify two classes of models that can potentially generate social 
returns to education.  The first they refer to as non-pecuniary externalities.  These 
theories motivate externalities by focusing on the interchanges among workers within 
a city.  The second class of theories is classified as pecuniary externalities.  Within 
this class of models, firms take advantage of the skilled labor pool by investing more 
heavily in complementary technologies.26  Both classes of models generate a positive 
relationship between workers’ wages and the level of skill in the area.  Therefore, 
their empirical work cannot support one set of theories over the other. 
In their empirical work, they argue that while the correlation between the level 
of education and the level of earnings across countries or states is undeniably 
positive, the direction of the causality is not as clear.  While high skill areas might 
lead to high levels of earnings, it is also possible that individuals in areas with high 
levels of earnings have a stronger taste for education.  They rely on cross-state and 
time-series variation in compulsory schooling laws to identify exogenous variation in 
the levels of schooling across states and across time.  Using instrumental variables, 
they find a much smaller effect of education on earnings than Rauch.  However, the 
compulsory schooling instruments are likely to pick up variation in schooling at the 
high school level, since it is the decision to leave high school that is affected by the 
                                                 




laws, but will not detect variation in higher levels of schooling.  It is still possible that 
there is an external effect of education at higher levels of education. 
Moretti (2004) focuses on the effect of the share of college graduates within a 
metropolitan area on individual wages using a variety of estimation strategies.  His 
theoretical framework lays out two competing effects of high levels of human capital.  
The first is the spillover effect, similar to the non-pecuniary theories mentioned in 
Acemoglu and Angrist.  The second effect is imperfect substitution between more and 
less skilled workers.  If there is a standard downward sloping demand curve for 
workers, less skilled workers will have higher wages if the concentration of highly 
skilled workers increases.  Conversely, more skilled workers will have lower wages.  
Given his empirical strategies, it is impossible to separately identify the effect of the 
spillover and the effect of imperfect substitution between types of workers.  In order 
to address this issue, he generates separate estimates of the combined 
spillover/imperfect substitution effect for differently skilled workers. 
Using NLSY data, he estimates a model that simultaneously controls for 
unobserved ability and a worker-city match by including a fixed individual-city 
match effect.  Identification of the social returns to education is off of an annualized 
measure of the increase in the college share in a metropolitan area between 1990 and 
2000 for workers who remain in the same metropolitan area.  Additionally, Moretti 
uses Census data to estimate the social returns to education, addressing two additional 
concerns.  First, he directly controls for city level productivity shocks, using a Katz & 
Murphy demand shift measure.  Second, he instruments for college share, using the 




grant college.  Moretti’s results are similar to those estimated by Rauch.  While his 
results control for the selection issue by controlling for an individual-city match, 
identification of social returns to education is coming from the change to the 
metropolitan area’s college share.  The only data available to compute college share 
are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.  Moretti then interpolates between these two 
data points to construct an annual time series of metropolitan area college share.  
Identification of the social returns to education is off of variation in the annual 
changes of this measure.  
4.2 Theoretical Model and Estimation Strategy 
The existing theoretical literature on social returns to education suggests that a 
worker’s productivity varies across metropolitan areas based on the skill level of the 
metro area in which the worker is located.  Under the assumption that firms make 
zero profits, this variation in productivity leads to variation in workers’ wages.  The 
following model, based heavily on earlier models by Lemieux (1998) and the 
comparative advantage model within Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002),27 
expands on this premise by decomposing the difference in a worker’s wages across 
metropolitan area skill levels into components due to observable worker 
characteristics, unobservables, and a level difference.  In the context of the education 
externalities literature, there is not a consensus on how worker characteristics are 
rewarded in differently skilled metro areas.  In Moretti’s theoretical work, increases 
                                                 
27 Lemieux (1998) focuses on wage differences between workers in the union and non-union sectors 
while Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2002) focus on industry and occupation wage differentials.  
Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002) extend the comparative advantage model to include 
learning of worker’s productivity over time.  This extension of the model provides for endogenous 
movement of workers across sectors.  Learning is not included in the present model, in part, because of 





in the number of highly educated workers have two competing effects: a spillover 
effect and imperfect substitution.  Therefore, on net, the effect of concentrations of 
highly skilled workers will be felt most strongly for less skilled workers.  One could 
imagine, however, in the pecuniary models laid out by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
that more skilled workers might be rewarded more, as they possess the skills most 
complementary to the increased investment in physical capital.  Regardless of the 
direction in which returns are rewarded differently, if these differences exist, workers 
are likely to select into the metro area type in which they have a comparative 
advantage.  Not accounting for the differential returns and selection of workers into 
areas based on their observable and unobservable skills will lead to biased estimates 
of the wage gap between high skill and low skill metro areas. 
To be more precise on how worker characteristics might affect their 
productivity and therefore their wages, a worker’s log wages can be expressed as 
(1)  ijjitijt Xy ψβ +=  
where y is worker i’s log wages in metro area j in period t, X is composed of 
observable worker characteristics, and ψ  is an error term.  ψ can be further 
decomposed as 
(2) ijjij bc θψ +=  
where c is a metro area specific intercept and θ  are unobservable worker 
characteristics that are differentially valued across metro areas as evidenced by the j 
subscript on b.  
While the above model could be estimated allowing the coefficients to vary 




simplicity into two skill types, high or low.  Combining the wage equations for high 







where H are the high skill metro areas, (1-H) are the low skill metro areas and 
u is an idiosyncratic error term.  Following Lemieux (1998), a crucial identification 
assumption for panel data estimation is that u is mean zero conditional on θ , and all 
leads and lags of x and H: 
(4) 0),,|( =iiiit HxuE θ  
where xi={xi1,…,xiT} and Hi={Hi1,…HiT} where T is the length of the panel.  
This strict exogeneity assumption rules out models in which workers move between 
metropolitan areas on the basis of productivity shocks.28  This assumption and the 
resulting implications for worker mobility between metropolitan areas are the main 
impetus for focusing some of the regressions below on workers who are likely to have 
left their previous jobs involuntarily.  
Focusing on the two sectors and setting c1-H=0, H−1β =1 and bj= jβ k, the wage 
equation becomes  
(5)  itiitHiitititHititHitit ukHkHXHXHHw +−++−++∂= θβθβ )1()1(ln  
 
where  is the wage gap between H and (1-H) metropolitan areas, k is the 
proportionality factor, i.e. the relative importance of unobservable skills, and u is the 
exogenous error term.  This specification allows for different returns to unobservables 
between high and low skill metropolitan areas, but restricts this relationship to be 
H∂
                                                 
28 See Lemieux (1998) for further discussion of which wage models are and are not consistent with the 




proportional to the difference to the returns to observables in high and low skill 
metropolitan areas.   
It is important to note that the θ  used here is not directly comparable to the θ  
used in the earlier chapters.  The θ  from the two preceding chapters is estimated from 
a wage equation first specified in Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis (1999) and captures all 
fixed characteristics of the worker valued by the firm.   Their wage equation also 
contains a term capturing fixed firm characteristics that affect wages, thereby 
separately capturing worker and firm heterogeneity.  The θ  in equation 1 above is 
similar in that it captures fixed worker characteristics, but observable skills are 
already controlled for, so these fixed worker characteristics are limited to 
unobservables.  In addition, the above equation does not separately control for firm 
effects, but in the empirical work below, does include a set of firm characteristics.29  
Separating out the observable and unobservable worker characteristics allows for 
different returns to the two different types of worker skills.  While by definition, the 
only difference between the two types of characteristics is what is and is not 
observable to the econometrician, in practice, characteristics unobservable to the 
econometrician are likely to be difficult for employers to quantify.  Allowing for 
different returns between observable and unobservable characteristics gives an 
empirical test of whether or not these two different types of skills are valued 
differently in the labor market. 
                                                 
29 While adding a firm heterogeneity term to the above equation is a potentially interesting extension of 
the research set out here, it is left for future work.  Among the additional issues that extending the 
research in this direction brings up is that measuring firm effects requires a longer panel of data and the 




Equation 5 as written above is not estimable because of the θ  term, which is 
by definition unobservable.  In models in which the return to unobservables are held 
constant across differently skilled areas, this term can be dealt with by using standard 
panel data techniques using either a fixed worker effect or first-differencing the wage 
equation.  These techniques, however, do not allow for the returns to unobservables to 
vary.  Both Lemieux (1998), focusing on the union/non-union wage gap, and 
Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2002), focusing on industry and occupation 
wage differentials, have provided variants on these standard estimation strategies 
which identify all of the parameters of this type of model.  In order to derive the final 














Equation 6 is then lagged one period and the resulting equation is plugged into 





























Estimating equation 7 via non-linear least squares will yield inconsistent 
estimates due to the correlation of lagged wages with the error term.  Both Lemieux 
(1998) and Gibbons et al (2002) suggest similar instrumenting strategies to overcome 
this endogeneity problem.  In particular, the panel data is further utilized to find 
instruments correlated with lagged wages that are uncorrelated with innovations to 




time t and t-1, or in the context of the current model, metro area skill type in t and t-1.  
Under the strictly exogeneity assumption, that uit is exogenous to the leads and lags of 
the independent variables, the sector histories will also be uncorrelated with uit.  
Changes in sector history, however, are likely to be correlated with lagged wages, as 
workers are likely to move between sectors in response to their wage levels.  Sector 
history remains a valid instrument as long as workers are not moving between sectors 
in response to productivity shocks.  In this case, the workers are responding to 
changes in their expected wages in sectors, and their lagged wages and current wages 
are likely to be correlated with the change in sector affiliation, violating the 
exogeneity restriction necessary for a valid instrument. 
Within this chapter, the concern that productivity shocks are inducing the 
movement of workers across metropolitan areas are addressed by estimating equation 
7 separately for a sample of workers likely to be involuntary switchers.  In particular, 
the data used here contains information not only on a worker’s wages but also on the 
worker’s firm.  If the worker’s firm suffered a large job destruction rate in the period 
that the worker left the firm, it is likely that the worker is moving involuntarily as the 
result of a mass layoff.  Other papers have used similar strategies focusing on the 
level of job destruction to define periods likely to be mass layoffs.30
In addition to directly measuring the differences in the returns to 
unobservables across differently skilled metropolitan areas, this chapter differs from 
the existing literature on education externalities in other ways.  Most of the existing 
literature uses either the average education level or the percentage of college 
graduates within a metropolitan area to define its skill.  Here, metropolitan areas are 
                                                 




divided into two groups, high and low skill.  These two groups were chosen in order 
to limit the number of metro area types being considered.  This approach has 
advantages and disadvantages.  While some of the information about metropolitan 
areas is lost, chapter 2 highlighted the fact that local labor markets can largely be 
qualified as falling into one of two skill groups.  One clear disadvantage is that it is 
more difficult to quantify the effect of a given increase in the share of college 
graduates on the wage premium of high skill areas.  Future research can directly test 
whether one approach fits the data better than the other. 
The other key difference is that others have largely focused on identifying the 
effect of city skill off of longitudinal changes in the skill of an area and focused on 
workers who remain in the same city.   In the results that follow, the variation in city 
skill is all in the cross-section, and its effect is measured off of workers who switch 
the metropolitan area in which they work.  There is some concern that workers who 
change jobs are a non-random sample of workers.  This concern is partially addressed 
by the focus on the sample of workers who were likely to have faced mass layoffs.  
As for the source of variation in city skill, there are advantages and disadvantages to 
focusing on cross-sectional differences.  The main disadvantage is that city skill is 
largely a permanent characteristic of a city and is highly correlated with other 
characteristics of the city, which are likely to effect wages, such as industrial mix.  
Some of the characteristics are directly controlled for in the wage equations below, 
but the potential of additional omitted city characteristics remains.  The main 
advantage to using the cross-sectional variation is that this is where the bulk of the 




appear to becoming more skilled at similar rates.  Additionally, variation in city skill 
in the cross section is likely due, in part, to historical factors that are exogenous to 
workers current decisions on where to work.  Changes to the college share, on the 
other hand, are likely more strongly correlated with workers current decisions. 
 
4.3 Data 
 All of the data used in this research are part of the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics program at the Census Bureau.  Information on workers comes 
from the Unemployment Insurance wage records for the selected three states.31  These 
files contain person identifiers that allow one to track a worker’s earnings.  The UI 
wage records contain virtually all business employment for the states included in the 
analysis.  The disadvantage of using the UI wage data to characterize workers is the 
very limited demographic information available.  Within the Census bureau, this 
problem has been partially overcome by combining the UI wage data with other 
administrative data containing information on date of birth, place of birth, and gender.  
Additionally, this research utilizes a matched sample with the Decennial Census that 
allows for a richer set of controls for observable skill. 
 The quasi-first-differencing estimation strategy requires a panel of two jobs 
for each worker for estimation.  The sample of workers was chosen as the set of all 
workers in the three states who matched to the 2000 Decennial Census Sample, held 
two jobs between 1999 and 2001, and were between the ages of 25 and 65.  The date 
range was chosen to restrict the sample to be close to 2000 so that the education 
                                                 
31 Three states were selected on the basis of time-series availability at the time of project inception.  





information for individual workers and for metropolitan areas remained accurate.  
Choosing additional years further from 2000 would require additional assumption on 
the evolution of both individuals’ and metropolitan areas’ skill. 
 The UI wage records contain information on a workers quarterly wages but do 
not have information regarding the hours or weeks worked.  Only earnings at the 
dominant job is used where the dominant job is defined as the job at which the worker 
had the greatest earnings within a quarter.  An annualized wage measure is 
constructed for each worker at each job as follows: if a worker worked one full 
quarter at a job his annual wage is four times is full quarter earnings, if a worker 
worked two full quarters at a job his annual wage is 2 times the sum of the two full 
quarters of earnings, if a worker worked 3 full quarters at a job then the annual wage 
is four thirds the sum of the three full quarters of earnings, if a worker worked 4 full 
quarters at a job then the annual wage is the sum of the four full quarters of 
earnings.32  The number of full quarters used to construct the annual wage is then 
included as an additional control in all of the wage equations.   
 Following the approach used by Gibbons et. al (2002), a skill index is created 
to control for the observable skills of workers.  Including the skill index allows for a 
rich characterization of workers’ skills without increasing the number of parameters 
to be estimated in the final wage equation.  The index is created from a regression of 
log wages on human capital characteristics (high school, some college and college 
graduate indicators, potential experience and its square) and controls (metro area, 
gender, sic division, indicator for a small firm, time dummies, and indicators for the 
number of full quarters used to calculate the wage measure).  The fitted value from 
                                                 




the above regression is then calculated using the workers’ values for human capital 
characteristics and average values over the sample for the controls.  The measure is 
then demeaned.  Coefficients from the wage regression are listed in Appendix B. 
 A basic model of social returns to education suggests that an individual 
worker’s wages are a function of his own characteristics and the education level of 
other workers.  The existing theoretical literature provides little direction in defining 
the set of other workers whose education level is relevant.  Within the empirical 
literature, different geographic regions used for this purpose include the country, the 
state, and the metropolitan area.  In order to be comparable with the existing 
literature, this chapter also focuses on the education level of the metropolitan area.  
Choosing the metropolitan area suggests that an individual is most influenced by the 
workers with whom he is likely to interact.  This definition is consistent with both the 
non-pecuniary spillovers literature in which workers interactions are the key and with 
the pecuniary spillovers literature in which businesses make investment decisions 
based on the skill level of the available labor pool.   
Counties which do not fall into metro areas are aggregated to state-level non-
metro areas.  In the current specification, metropolitan areas are classified as high 
skill or low skill areas.  In order to classify metro areas by skill, the share of workers 
who are college graduates is calculated for each metro area.  Figure 4.1 plots an 
employee-weighted kernel density estimate of this metro area skill measure.  As can 
be seen in the graph, the distribution appears to be bi-modal.  The minimum between 
the two modes occurs at 32% of the workers in a metro area with a college degree.  




therefore used as the cutoff skill level to define high and low skill metro areas.  The 
results are not directly comparable to the existing literature because the metropolitan 
area skill is not a continuous variable in the following regressions.   
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4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 provides the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in 
the regressions.  As can be seen from the table, roughly half of the workers are in a 
metropolitan area that can be classified as high skill and half are in a low skill 
metropolitan area.  Movements across the metropolitan areas in the two jobs for each 
worker are surprisingly symmetrical.  Around 41% of workers are in a high skill 
metropolitan area in each of their two jobs and 42% are in a low skill metropolitan 




metropolitan area and 9% move from a low to a high skill metropolitan area.  The 
skill index is mean zero by construction.  Time dummies are provided for each job to 
control for the fact that the workers wages are coming from different time periods and 
aggregate wage levels may be changing over the three-year time period.  Finally, 
wage controls capture the number of full quarter earnings used to construct each of 
the annual earnings measures for each job.  Over half of the jobs have earnings from 




Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
2 lists some basic regression results that measure the effect of 
controlling for different worker and firm characteristics on the wage differential 
between high and low skill metropolitan areas.  All regressions include time dummies 
and controls for the number of quarters used to construct the wage measure.  The first 
column only includes a high skill metro area indicator along with the wage controls 
Variable Mean Std Dev
Log annual wage 10.4183 0.7769
High skill msa 0.4978
Low skill msa 0.5022
High high msa 0.4142
High low msa 0.0803
Low high msa 0.0869



























1 fq job 0.1672
2 fq job 0.1471
3 fq job 0.1087






and time dummies.  The raw wage differential measured from this equation is 25% 
and is strongly significant.  The second column includes both worker and firm 
characteristics.  In this regression the wage differential is reduces to 16%.  In the third 
column, the coefficient on the individual workers skill level is allowed to vary in high 
and low skill metropolitan areas.   While the coefficient on county skill suggests that 
the returns to skill are 6% higher in high skill metropolitan areas than low skill 
metropolitan areas that have an implicit coefficient of one, the wage differential 
remains unchanged from the earlier specification.  Column four shows the results 
from a fixed person effects regression.  Controlling for unobservable worker skills 
reduces the size of the wage differential substantially to approximately 4%.  The 
differential between the returns to observable skills in low and high skill metropolitan 
areas decreases to 0.5% in this specification.  Although this regression controls for 
unobservable skills, the returns to unobservable skills are restricted to being the same 




Table 4.2: OLS, Fixed Effect, Difference in Differences 
tandard errors are listed directly below the parameter estimates.  The coefficient on skill-metro area 
1 2 3 4 5 6
raw comp ols fe
job1 job2
Intercept 10.6584 10.3679 10.3680 10.1309 10.3106
0.0049 0.0063 0.0063 0.0087 0.0078
High skill msa 0.2498 0.1605 0.1605 0.0350
0.0017 0.0014 0.0014 0.0019
Low skill msa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skill 1.0000
0.0023
High skill msa*skill 1.0558 1.0049 1.0677 1.0654
0.0048 0.0014 0.0070 0.0068
Low skill msa*skill 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
High-high msa 0.1871 0.1865
0.0022 0.0022
High-low msa 0.1388 0.1163
0.0038 0.0038
Low-high msa 0.1111 0.1564
0.0037 0.0037
Male 0.3829 0.3825 0.3828 0.3797
0.0015 0.0015 0.0020 0.0020
Female 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firm characteristics:
Agr, mining, constr 0.2421 0.2415 -0.0277 0.2381 0.2430
0.0057 0.0057 0.0056 0.0087 0.0076
Manufacturing 0.2336 0.2324 0.0172 0.2369 0.2259
0.0052 0.0052 0.0050 0.0081 0.0069
TCU 0.2484 0.2481 -0.0052 0.2511 0.2361
0.0056 0.0056 0.0054 0.0086 0.0074
Wholesale 0.2433 0.2426 -0.0097 0.2412 0.2399
0.0056 0.0056 0.0052 0.0085 0.0074
Retail -0.1694 -0.1700 -0.1643 -0.1858 -0.1506
0.0053 0.0053 0.0050 0.0082 0.0070
FIRE 0.2842 0.2836 -0.0182 0.2758 0.2820
0.0055 0.0055 0.0053 0.0084 0.0072
Services 0.0588 0.0579 -0.0822 0.0400 0.0751
0.0051 0.0051 0.0046 0.0078 0.0066
Public Admin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Small Firm Indicator -0.1384 -0.1387 -0.0627 -0.1491 -0.1228
0.0016 0.0016 0.0014 0.0022 0.0023
Person effect
R-Squared 0.07 0.34 0.34 0.89











Table 4.2: continued 
Columns 5 and 6 show the results from a specification in which each of the 





listed a nd 
job1 job2 diff
high-high 0.1871 0.1865 -0.0006




low-high 0.1111 0.1564 0.0453






nd side coefficients is interacted with an indicator for job 1 or job 2.  In lieu 
the high skill metropolitan area indicator, there are four indicators for the four 
different groups of worker movement across metropolitan area types: high to hi
high to low, low to high, low to low (omitted group).  These coefficients follow a 
predictable pattern and will be discussed more fully in the difference in differences
estimates below.  The returns to observable skill are similar to the earlier OLS result
The remaining coefficients are for the firm characteristics and are consistent in sign 
and magnitude across all specifications except for the person fixed effects regression
From these estimates difference in differences estimates are calculated and 
t the end of the table.  The first difference is across job 1 and 2 (columns 5 a
6) separately for each type of worker movement, i.e. high to high skill metro area, 
high to low skill metro area, and low to high skill metro area.  Workers who move 
between jobs that are both in low skill areas are the omitted group.  This difference 
separates out the component of the change in a workers wages when changing jobs 
that is due to the type of metropolitan area in which the two jobs are located.  The 




metro area type.  This difference separates out the effect of changing jobs for work
in low skill areas who move to high minus those who stay in low or workers in high 
skill areas who stay in high minus those who move to low.  Constructing the 
difference in difference in this fashion allows for variation in worker types an
opportunities across the originating metro area skill types. 
If movement across metropolitan area types were ex
ers 
d job 





nous mobility.  Gibbons et al 
(2002) on 
, 
f a high skill metropolitan area on a workers wages would be the same 
whether the worker moved into or out of a high skill area.  Focusing on the diff
in difference results in bold at the bottom of table 4.2, workers who move from a low 
to a high skill metropolitan area receive a 4.5% wage premium over those who stayed 
in a low.  However, workers who stay in a high skill metropolitan area receive a 2.2% 
wage premium over those who move into a low skill metropolitan area.  Given that 
the returns to high skill metropolitan areas are higher for workers who move toward 
high skill metropolitan areas, it is likely that worker mobility across metropolitan 
areas is not completely exogenous.  Put differently, workers who leave a high skill
metropolitan area receive less of a penalty for leaving than the bonus received by 
workers who leave low skill metropolitan areas.  This pattern of wage changes 
suggests that workers currently in high skill metropolitan areas only move to low
metropolitan areas when they find jobs with wages that are attractive relative to their 
current earnings in a high skill metropolitan area. 
There are multiple ways to address endoge
 directly instrument for the choice of sector in time t by using the interacti




it is unclear how to construct a long time series of metro area affiliations.  As an 
alternative approach, the sample of workers is subset to the sample of moves that





ore in line 
ecifications in columns 5 and 6 of table 4.2 for the 
new sa n 
                                                
33.  The administrative data provides no information from the 
worker as to why the worker left a job.  However, the employee-employer match 
aspect of the data can be utilized to define firms that appear to be laying off large 
portions of the workforce.  Previous research has similarly used periods of large jo
destruction to identify displacement activity.34  These sharp reductions in the number
of employees are likely to lead to worker separations that are exogenous to the 
decisions of the worker.  Two additional samples of workers are constructed to 
capture these exogenous separations: workers who leave a firm at time t in which the 
firm’s employment falls by 20% between t and t+1 and workers who leave a firm that 
shrinks by 10% over the same time period.  The samples are 4% and 8%, 
respectively, of the size of the original sample.  While the 20% cutoff is m
with the literature on mass layoffs, the 10% cutoff is likely to be more representative 
of the full sample of workers. 
Table 4.3 repeats the sp
mples described above.  The corresponding difference in differences is show
at the bottom of the table.  For the sample with 20% job loss at the firm, workers who 
move from a low to a high skill metro area receive a 3.5% wage premium over those 
who remain at low skill metropolitan areas, while workers who remain in a high skill 
 
33 Lemieux (1998) uses a similar approach to identify a union premium with a dataset that contains 
information on the reason why a worker left his last job as reported by the worker. 
34 Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) identify a “mass layoff” sample by focusing on workers 
who leave a firm in which “the firms’ employment in the year following their departure [in the early 
and mid 1980s] was 30-percent or more below their maximum levels during the late 1970’s.”  
Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) identify a mass layoff by focusing on workers who leave a firm in 
which there is a 30% reduction in jobs from one quarter to the next.  The measure used here more 




metropolitan area receive a 1.6% wage premium.  Similarly, for the sample with 10% 
job loss at the firm, workers who move from a low to a high skill metropolitan area 
receive a 4.0% wage premium while workers who remain in a high skill metropolita
area receive a 3.0% wage premium over those who leave.  The difference between the 
two estimates is smaller for either of these two samples suggesting that a greater 
portion of the moves in the layoff samples is the result of involuntary separations.
While the difference between the two estimates is similar for the two layoff samples
the levels of the premiums are smaller in the sample defined by firms shrinking 20%.  
Other research that has focused on the earnings outcomes of workers finds similar 






                                                
35  In
the second sample, the premiums are more in line with those found in table 4.2, and 
the difference between the workers who leave and enter metropolitan areas is similar
Due to the tradeoffs in using each of the samples, both are used to test the sensitivity 
of the final results. 
 
35 See Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).  In addition to using a different definition of mass 
layoffs, Jacobson et al also motivate their research with a theoretical model that is different from the 




Table 4.3: Difference in Differences, Layoff Sample 
s.  The coefficient on skill-metro area 
1 2 3 4
job1 job2 job1 job2
Intercept 9.9107 10.1457 9.9836 10.2051
0.0531 0.0317 0.0330 0.0222
High skill msa*skill 1.0724 1.0791 1.0893 1.0897
0.0271 0.0283 0.0187 0.0188
Low skill msa*skill 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
    
High-high msa 0.2041 0.2087 0.1986 0.2053
0.0082 0.0081 0.0057 0.0057
High-low msa 0.1833 0.1715 0.1699 0.1467
0.0145 0.0145 0.0098 0.0098
Low-high msa 0.1402 0.1749 0.1277 0.1680
0.0145 0.0145 0.0099 0.0099
Male 0.4101 0.4024 0.3951 0.3868
0.0078 0.0078 0.0053 0.0054
Female 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firm characteristics:
Agr, mining, constr 0.3963 0.3354 0.3621 0.3160
0.0522 0.0300 0.0325 0.0212
Manufacturing 0.3776 0.2742 0.3141 0.2350
0.0520 0.0292 0.0321 0.0204
TCU 0.3598 0.2811 0.3362 0.2564
0.0537 0.0316 0.0334 0.0220
Wholesale 0.4214 0.2675 0.3555 0.2413
0.0530 0.0311 0.0329 0.0216
Retail -0.0686 -0.1680 -0.1016 -0.1469
0.0525 0.0300 0.0323 0.0208
FIRE 0.5820 0.3528 0.4824 0.3304
0.0532 0.0308 0.0328 0.0213
Services 0.2254 0.1485 0.1808 0.1233
0.0515 0.0282 0.0317 0.0198
Public Admin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Small firm indicator -0.1268 -0.1103 -0.1336 -0.1129








Standard errors are listed directly below the parameter estimate








Table 4.3: Difference in Differences, Layoff Sample, continued 
parative advantage in 
the unobservables across metropolitan area types is allowed by incorporating an 
interaction between the high skill metro area dummy and the worker effect.  The first 
column contains results using the full sample of workers.  In the second column, firm 
controls are dropped in order to determine if the wage premium of high skill 
metropolitan areas is affected by the composition of firms.  In the third column, non-
metro areas are excluded from the analysis.  The purpose of this sensitivity check is 
two fold.  First, non-metro area skill is measured over all counties within a state.  This 
type of area is not directly comparable to a metro area because the counties are not 
necessarily contiguous and because they are likely to be more heterogeneous than the 
counties in a metro area.  In addition, much of the research on education spillovers 
focuses on metropolitan areas because by definition metro areas have higher 
concentrations of workers.  Because workers are more concentrated, their interactions 
amongst themselves are likely to be more frequent than among workers in a non-
metro area.  Finally, column 4 focuses on a sample in which both the first and second 
job of the worker has a wage measure that was constructed from four full quarters of 
earnings. 
job1 job2 diff job1 job2 diff
high-high 0.2041 0.2087 0.0046 high-high 0.1986 0.2053 0.0067
high-low 0.1833 0.1715 -0.0118 high-low 0.1699 0.1467 -0.0233
0.0164 0.0300
0.0205 0.0139
job1 job2 diff job1 job2 diff
low-high 0.1402 0.1749 0.0347 low-high 0.1277 0.1680 0.0403










Table 4.4: Non-linear Two Stage Least Squares 
Standard errors are listed directly below the parameter estimates.  The coefficien
interaction is normalized to one in low skill metro areas. 
 
Focusing on the full sample in column 1, the coefficient on th
t on skill-metro area 
e high skill 
etropolitan areas after allowing for different returns to both observable and 
unobservable skills.  The coefficient is negative but not significantly different from 
zero.  The coefficient on the interaction between high skill metropolitan area and the 
index of the workers observables skills is greater than one, but not significantly.  
These results suggest that workers in high skill and low skill metro areas receive 
slightly larger returns to their observable and unobservable skills.  The coefficient on 
the interaction between the high skill metro area indicator and the worker’s fixed 
1 2 3 4
all nofirm msa longjob
ill msa -0.0355 0.0360 -0.0044 -0.1588
0.0497 0.0483 0.0532 0.0764
High skill msa * skill 1.0066 0.9997 1.0034 1.0183
0.0047 0.0046 0.0050 0.0072
Low skill msa * skill 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
 
High skill msa * 1.0144 1.0160 1.0146 1.0162
    worker effect 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006
Firm characteristics:
seinsmall -0.0623 -0.0594 -0.0683
0.0014 0.0015 0.0023
Agr., mining, constr. -0.0259 -0.0322 -0.0294
0.0056 0.0060 0.0083
Manufacturing 0.0192 0.0057 0.0197
0.0050 0.0053 0.0072
TCU -0.0035 -0.0145 0.0050
0.0054 0.0057 0.0079
Wholesale -0.0080 -0.0170 -0.0095
0.0052 0.0056 0.0076
Retail -0.1607 -0.1692 -0.1378
0.0050 0.0054 0.0074
FIRE -0.0167 -0.0221 -0.0225
0.0053 0.0056 0.0077
Services -0.0795 -0.0865 -0.0680
0.0046 0.0050 0.0066
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.67
Observations 409901 409901 377878 127378
High sk





effect is significantly different from one, suggesting the gap between the returns in
high and low skill metro areas is greater for unobservable skills than it is for 
observable skills.  While the relative returns to unobservable skill are restricted to 
proportional to the relative returns to observable skill, this coefficient provides the 
proportionality constant between the two types of returns.  The remaining coe
on firm characteristics are of similar sign and magnitude in comparisons across the 
columns and with the earlier person fixed effects results in table 4.2. 
The results estimated on the remaining samples in table 4 show mixed results.  
In column 2, the firm characteristics are dropped from the specification.  While the 










.  It 
efficient on the interaction of high skill metro area and skill index is now less 
than one.  Despite the fact that the key coefficients are not significant, the firm 
characteristics appear to play an important role suggesting that differences across 
metro areas may be due, in part, to firm characteristics.  Excluding non metro areas in
column 3 does not appear to have much affect on either of the two key variables
Focusing on jobs in which workers have greater attachment in column 4 does lead
different results.  The coefficient on the high skill metro area dummy is large and 
negative.  The interaction of high skill metro area and the skill index is also 
significantly greater than one suggesting that the returns to skill are higher in high 
skill metro areas.  Although not reported in here, similarly restricting the earlier fix
effect specification to this sample does not affect the results in the same way
appears that the nonlinear estimation is more sensitive to the wage measure.   




results is the same and, therefore, the remaining estimation relies on the full samp
The proportionality factor measuring the gap between high and low skill metro
on the returns to unobserved ability relative to observed ability is consistently greate
than one and very similar across all the specifications.   
While the coefficient measuring the wage gap between high and low skill 
metro areas seems inconsistent with the earlier specifications and most of the 













t to interpret.  In particular, this coefficient measures the wage gap after 
allowing for different returns to observable and unobservable skills.  Given tha
wage gap is a residual measure of the wage differences between workers in high 
low skill metro areas after accounting for worker and firm characteristics, one w
expect that the results in table 4 would be different from the earlier results.  These 
results suggest that more skilled workers, on both observable and unobservable 
dimensions, receive greater benefits from working in a high skill area than less skilled
workers, although the results are imprecisely measured.  Given that some of the wa
gap between the two types of areas may be accounted for by different returns to 
unobservables, one would expect the wage gap to be smaller as measured in table 4.4.  
The negative coefficients and the inconsistency across columns are surprising, 
however.  Clearly, after accounting for the worker and firm characteristics and 
allowing the returns to worker skills to vary, the remaining wage gap is not as well 
defined.  Still, higher returns to both observable and unobservable skills suggest
specific patterns of spillovers or additional investment that disproportionately b




As mentioned above, the wage equation as estimated contains a lagged wa
term that is instrumented for with sectoral history dummies that consist of interactions 
between a workers metro
ge 




 as an 
Table 4.5: F-Test of Excluded Instruments 
 
two additional samples designed to focus 
nously left their previous employer.  
he results in column 1 are different than the earlier coefficients.  The wage gap 
betwee
                                                
nstruments used in linear two stage least squares involve a test of the 
significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage regressions.  The 
appropriate first stage equation in non linear two stage least squares, however, 
involves regressing the endogenous variable on the gradient of the second sta
term with respect to the structural parameters.36  In lieu of estimating the ap
highly non-linear first stage equation, the linear first stage equation is estimated
approximation.  The F tests of the excluded instruments are presented in table 4.5.  
Across all of the different samples, the sectoral history dummies strongly predict 
lagged wages. 
 
all men nofirm msa longjob
.05 19.77 103.03 90.25 20.26F-stat 70
 
 Table 4.6 contains results from the 
on workers who are more likely to have exoge
T
n high and low skill metro areas is now large and positive, although still not 
significantly different from zero.  The coefficient on the interaction between high 
skill metro area and observable skills is not significantly different from one 
suggesting that the returns to these skills are the same in high and low skill metro 
 




areas.  The coefficient on the interaction between high skill metro area and the wor
fixed effect is significantly different from one, but the interpretation is diffic
that it is proportional to the difference in the returns to observable skills which are 
different in high and low skill metro areas.  In contrast with column 1, the results in 
column 2 are more similar to those in table 4.4.  Although the coefficient on the 
interaction between high skill metro area and observable skills is not significantly 
different from 1, all of the coefficients are of the same sign and magnitude as those in
table 3.  These results provide somewhat contradictory evidence on the importan
focusing on exogenous moves.  The odd results in column 1 may also be due to the
fact that workers leaving firms with mass layoffs receive a wage penalty.  Previous 
research on mass layoffs by Jacobson et al (1993) attribute this wage penalty to loss 
of firm-specific knowledge or a reshuffling of workers into lower quality job 
matches.  Neither of these theories is currently incorporated into the wage model laid
out above.  Extension of the model in these directions in order to incorporate the 
empirical finding that wage losses occur with separations after mass layoff is l
future research.  Given that the sign and magnitude of the coefficients in column 2 
follows the same patterns as that in table 4, the insignificant sign on the interactio
high skill metro area and observable skill may be due to the smaller sample size.  
Table 4.7 provides the F-statistics of the excluded instruments from the linearized 
first stage regression.  Even in the smaller samples used in table 6, the sectoral history 













Table 4.6: Non-linear Instrumental Variables, Layoff Sample 
1 2
jdr>0.2 jdr>0
High skill msa 0.1652 -0.1775
Standard errors are listed directly below the parameter estimates. 
 
Table 4.7: Test of Excluded Instruments, Layoff Sample 
 
The results in tables 4.4 and 4.6 are also different than those found by Moretti 
in which the returns to changes in the college share were felt most by low skill 
workers.  Moretti’s work suggests that although the spillover is important for all 
worker groups, as the number of high skill workers increase their returns decrease, 
and therefore the net effect of an increase in college share is smaller for more skilled 
workers.  The results above may be different for a variety of reasons.  First 
identification of the importance of metro area skill is determined by utilizing the 







High skill msa * 1.0157 1.0156
    worker effect 0.0010 0.0007
Firm characteristics:
Small firm indicator -0.0728 -0.0677
0.0053 0.0036





















in Moretti’s specification, imperfect substitution between workers of different skill 
types is likely playing a larger role.  Within his specification, influxes of more skilled 
workers need to be absorbed by the metro area.  It is possible that in the short run the 
imperfect substitution plays a more dominant role, while the cross section is 
identifying a long run phenomenon.  In the results above, the greater the fraction of 
high skill workers, the greater the return to skill, suggesting that the productivity of 
high skill workers increases as their numbers increase.  In addition, identification in 
Moretti’s specification is determined by workers who remain in a metro area while in 
the above results identification is determined by workers who move across metro 
areas of different skill types.  These two different samples may be different among a 
variety of other dimensions.   
4.5 Conclusion 
er wages in highly 
killed metro areas.  Often, this correlation is interpreted as an external return to 
education.  However, workers in more skilled areas may differ on more than just their 





 Many researchers have found that workers receive high
s
observable skills.  While others have attempted to contro
eristics of workers that affect their wages, this is the first research that allows 
the returns to both observable and unobservable worker characteristics to vary a
high and low skill metro areas.  Using a panel dataset of workers, non-linear 
instrumental variables is used to estimate a wage equation with controls for high ski
metro area, an interaction between high skill metro area and skill, and an interaction 




return to unobservable skill, captured by the person effect, is determined by workers 
who change jobs and metro areas.   
Allowing for variation in these returns does affect the remaining wage gap 
between high and low skill metro areas.  Workers in high skill areas appear to receive 
higher returns for both their observable and unobservable characteristic, altho
effects are not precisely measured.  In addition, the employer-employee match aspec
of the data is utilized to construct a sample of workers who are likely to have been 
laid off of their last job.  This group of workers has returns across high and low skill 
metro areas that are more consistent with exogenous movement of workers.  The 
pattern of returns to observable and unobservable skill found in the wage regressio
suggests a pattern of spillovers from education that disproportionately favors highly 




ture research to determine which models of social 








The two following chapters then outline models that fit the latter category.  
The third chapter outlines a model in which worker skill and technology investment 
are complementary.  Firms must make investment decisions before hiring workers, 
and therefore choose a level of investment based on the type of worker they expect to 
be able to hire.  Within this framework, firms invest more in technology in high 
human capital areas.  The empirical work testing this basic prediction of the model 
affirms this result.  A one standard deviation increase in county skill leads to a 10% 
increase in the amount of computer investment of manufacturing firms in 1992.  
While the empirical work is focused on one industry in one time period, it is likely 
that the results are more broadly applicable to other instances in which firms face an 
 
The preceding chapters focus on different aspects of geographic 
concentrations of skilled workers.  The second chapter focused on describing patterns 
of skilled workers across geography and how these patterns evolve over time.  
Despite the fact that workers are highly mobile, they choose locations in non-random 
patterns.  Therefore, the overall distribution of skill across local labor markets 
remains constant although there is a continuous reshuffling of workers.  Given the 
variation in worker skill across geography, the potential exists for location to play
important role in a variety of different models.  While there are many models in 
which considering the U.S. labor market as one entity remains appropriate, there are 





exogenous technological shock.  In the longer term, firms are likely to choose 
cations with workers suitable to the best technology.  In addition to explaining 










variation in firm’s technology decisions across the United States, the theo
also applicable to explaining variation in technology investment across countries.   
Finally, the fourth chapter looks at how variation in the concentration of
skilled labor in metropolitan areas affects worker wages.  The correlation between the 
overall level of worker wages and the skill level of a metropolitan area is a well
established empirical fact.  Two models that would explain this relationship are 
models in which there are information spillovers and models such as the one outlined 
in the preceding chapter in which firms’ investment depends upon the skill level 
the local labor market.  However, testing this implication of either of the models 
above is complicated by the fact that while there is correlation between worker wages 
and th
 Workers are mobile and are likely to choose to work in locations in which 
their skills are rewarded the most highly, i.e. where they have comparative advantage.
Previous research has accounted for this possibility by allowing the returns to worke
observable characteristics to vary across metropolitan areas.  This chapter extends 
upon that research by allowing for the returns to unobservables to also vary acros
metropolitan areas.  The results show that workers are more highly compensated for 
both their observable and unobservable skills in highly skilled metro areas.   The 
remaining wage gap between workers in high and low skill metro areas becomes 
insignificant.  It is left for future research to determine what this pattern of worker 




This dissertation has outlined two models in which the variation in skill
labor across local labor markets plays an important role in the economy.  Clearly,
there are possibly many other models in which this variation would also be important





from ac ets. 
  





Appendix A: Investment Equation Specification 
capital investment equation.  While a pure measure of firm type is not available, we 
ited dynamics, it is impossible to distinguish between investment 
nd capital stock within the model.  Empirically, however, it is likely that wages are 
influenced by the sum of previous period’s investments of the worker’s firm, or the 
capital stock.  Keeping this distinction in mind, it is clearer if equation 13.10 is re-
written as 
 
in which the term in parentheses is the firm effect from the wage equation, Ijt is 
computer investment and kjt-1 is the capital stock in the previous period.  This 




Written in this form, it becomes clear that equation 3.10 contains an omitted variable, 
kjt-1.  Given that kjt-1 is correlated with ψ and with slt-1, all of the coefficients in the 
model are potentially biased.  While there is no available information on the stock of 
computer investment in the previous period, a measure of the stock of machinery 
equipment is available in 1991.37  The stock of machinery equipment includes the 
stock of computer equipment, but is a much broader measure.  While not the ideal 
measure, adding the capital stock variable will help to determine the extent to which 
the specification problem mentioned above is effecting the results, and in particular, 
the coefficient on county skill.  Results are shown in the last column of table 3 and 
discussed in the text. 
 Additiona esults will occur if one assumes that computer 
investme e in a way that is not captured by either the firm 
effect, the firm’s skill level, nor the local labor market skill level, i.e. serially 
correlated technology shocks, such that 
 
                                                
 
The model suggests that the firm type needs to be included as a control in the 
do measure ψ, the firm effect from the wage equation, and use it in estimating 
equation 10.  In order to get a handle on the extent of the potential bias due to this 
problem, it is first necessary to distinguish between capital investment and capital 
stock.  Due to its lim
a
jtltjtjjt skAI υφφφ
α ++++= −− 121
/1
10 ˆ)ln(ln
sspecified due to the inclusion of lagged capital stock.  The true equation can be re-
l biases to the r
nt is correlated over tim
 
37 For details on the creation of this variable see Chiang (2003).  The basic methodology involves using 
the reported capital stock measure in Census years and applying the perpetual inventory method for 
non-Census years. 
jtjtltjtjjt kskAI υφφφφ
α +−+++= −−− 11121
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in which λ captures the serial correlation and η is the current peri
coefficient on the firm effect in the original specification will be b
od innovation.  The 
iased upward 
ecause, as shown above, the firm effect contains information on the previous 







nent of the error term.   
To some extent, the inclusion of the capital stock as an additional control will
help to alleviate this problem.  If serial correlation of the error term is caused by
serially correlated technology shocks, the coefficient on the capital stock measure w
be biased upward but there should be no direct effect on the other coefficient’s 
included in the estimation.  Further, serial correlation of the error term and therefore 
the upward bias on the capital stock coefficient will likely bias the coefficients on the










































































1 fq job -0.2918 -0.2849
0.0022 0.0031
2 fq job -0.1879 -0.1926
0.0025 0.0034
3 fq job -0.1265 -0.1259
0.0027 0.0037
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